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9.1  Introduction 
When consumer electronics roll off the assembly line in Singapore, 
when there is a bumper wheat crop in China, or when shoe production 
expands in  Italy, the relevance to U.S. producers and consumers is 
tangible. The large U.S. trade deficit has become a source of concern 
familiar to Americans. When Japan liberalizes portfolio guidelines for 
life insurance companies, when there is a collapse of investment op- 
portunities in Latin America, or when fixed brokerage commissions 
are abolished in the City of  London, the relevance for Americans is 
much  less tangible.  But  the international flow of  capital is  no less 
important than the flow of goods. Indeed, there is an important sense 
in which capital flows have been the cause of the U.S. trade deficit in 
the 1980s, with U.S. government macroeconomic policies the driving 
force behind it all. 
International capital movements affect the U.S. economy in a num- 
ber of  ways. Banks, securities companies, and other providers of  fi- 
nancial services constitute the sector of the American economy that is 
most directly affected. They now compete with financial institutions 
in Tokyo, London, and Frankfurt, and around the world. Exports of 
financial and other services are a growing credit item in the U.S.  balance 
of  payments, and the current U.S. administration has placed a high 
priority on more favorable treatment of  U.S. financial institutions in 
bilateral trade negotiations, and on liberalization of trade in services 
559 560  Jeflkey A. FrankellSaburo  Okita/Peter  G. PetersodJames R. Schlesinger 
generally in the Uruguay round of negotiations under GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). 
The impact of international capital flows reaches far beyond a single 
sector of the American economy, however. Every U.S. firm feels the 
effect, which comes through two main channels. First is the availability 
of capital, as reflected in interest rates. Large corporations increasingly 
often borrow from foreign residents, and portfolio managers increas- 
ingly invest abroad. But even the many firms that borrow only at home, 
or the many individuals who hold only domestic assets, are affected, 
because U.S. interest rates areincreasingly determined on world capital 
markets jointly with other countries’ interest rates. The second channel 
through which U.S. producers are affected is the exchange rate, which 
by the 1980s has become overwhelmingly determined by flows of capital 
rather than flows of goods. Again, even those firms that do not export 
are affected, to the  extent  that  they  compete  with imports or buy 
imported inputs. 
This paper is organized in five sections. Section 9.2 reviews briefly 
the postwar history of the U.S. capital account up to the 1970s, a period 
throughout which Americans were steadily building up a positive net 
foreign investment position. Section 9.3 considers those factors, other 
than expected rates of return, that discourage or encourage interna- 
tional capital flow: transactions costs, government controls, taxes, de- 
fault and other political risk, and exchange risk. The record is generally 
one of gradually diminishing barriers. Section 9.4 describes the historic 
swing of the U.S. capital account in the 1980s toward massive borrow- 
ing from abroad. Section 9.5 examines international differences in rates 
of return on various assets and shows how the increase in interest rates 
in the United States in the early  1980s attracted the large net capital 
inflows. Section 9.6 concludes the paper with an analysis of U.S. gov- 
ernment policies-monetary,  tax, and spending-in  determining U.  S. 
saving, investment, and the net capital inflow. The lesson that emerges 
is that the primary source of  the large U.S. borrowing from abroad, 
and  therefore of  its counterpart the large  U.S. trade  deficit,  is  the 
federal budget deficit. 
9.2  Net U.S. Capital Outflows in the Period 1946-80 
Table 9.1 presents the figures for the U.S. balance of payments from 
1946 to 1985. The first half of the table breaks down the current account 
into its components: merchandise trade, investment income, travel and 
transportation, other services, and so forth. The second  half  of  the 
table shows the components of the reverse side of the balance of pay- 
ments coin, the capital account. Until the last few years of this period, 
private capital was on net steadily flowing out of the country. But the 
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9.2.1 
In the immediate aftermath of World War 11, the United States ran 
large trade surpluses, as measured either by the merchandise balance 
(goods alone) or the balance on goods and services. These surpluses 
were the counterpart to large trade deficits in Europe and elsewhere 
in the world. The war-ravaged countries had lost much of their indus- 
trial and agricultural capacity, and needed to import basic necessities 
of  consumption, as well as capital goods to rebuild their economies. 
They had a shortage of dollars with which to buy such goods. The flow 
of goods from the  United  States to Europe was financed partly  by 
foreign aid and other transfers, partly  by  lending, and partly  by an 
increase in  U.S. official holdings of international reserves. This last 
means that the United States was running a surplus in its overall balance 
of payments: the surplus in  the current account-defined as goods, 
services, and transfers-was  greater than the net private capital outflows. 
In the 1950s, as the European and other economies recovered, their 
trade balances improved and, as a natural consequence, the U.S. trade 
surplus returned to more normal levels. By the end of the decade, the 
surplus in goods and services had fallen below the deficit in transfers 
and private capital flows, so the United States was running substantial 
overall balance of payments deficits. 
The Period of “Dollar Shortage” 
9.2.2  The Balance of Payments Problem in the 1960s 
One could view the emerging U.S. deficit of this period, and the rest 
of  the world’s  surplus, as the natural outcome of  steady worldwide 
growth under the “dollar standard.” Although the 1944 conference at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, that established the postwar inter- 
national monetary system did not give the U.S. dollar this role officially, 
the dollar soon became the de facto reserve currency of the system, 
because  it  was  convertible  into gold and because  of  the economic 
wealth and political prestige of the United States. As world trade grew, 
countries needed to hold growing levels of reserves, and running bal- 
ance of  payments surpluses was the only way other countries had of 
acquiring dollar reserves. This is the sense in which the U.S.  balance 
of payments deficits could be viewed as a natural consequence of world- 
wide economic growth under the monetary system. Nevertheless, the 
increasing ratio of  dollars held abroad to gold held by the U.S.  gov- 
ernment began to cause concern. It seemed that the system could only 
become more and more vulnerable over time to a crisis in which the 
holders of  dollars around the world would try to cash in their claims 
for gold and the United States would be unable to pay. 
In the early  1960s, the balance of  payments deficit was entirely a 
deficit of  the capital account. The merchandise trade balance, goods 
and services balances, and current account were all in substantial sur- Table 9.1  International Statistics of U.S. International Transactions,  1946-85  (millions of  dollars) 
Remit- 
Net  tances 
Net  Travel  Other  Balance  Pensions, 
Merchandisea,b  Investment Income'  Military  and  Serv-  on Goods  and Other 
Year or  Transac-  Transpor-  ices  and  Unilateral  Current 
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-  16,620 
-  17,048 
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-  102,694 
-  2,638 
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-  106,466 
-  117,677 Table 9.1  (continued) 
U.S. Assets Abroad, Net 
(increasekapital outflow [ -  1) 
Foreign Assets in the U.S., Net 
(increasekapital outflow [ -1)  Statistical Discrepancy 
Other  Total 
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Official  Govern-  U.S.  Foreign  Other  Allocations of  Items with 
Year or  Reserve  ment  Private  Official  Foreign  Special Drawing  Sign 





















-  623 
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-  1,372 
~  2,805 
-  2.354 
-1.831 
-  1,359 I966  -7,321 
1 %7  -  9,757 
I968  -  10,977 
1968  -  11,585 
1970  -9,337 
1971  -  12,475 
1972  -  14,497 
1973  -  22,874 
1974  -  34,745 
1975  -39,703 
1976  -  51,269 
1977  -  34,785 
1978  -61,130 
1979  -64,331 
1980  -  86,l I8 
1981  -111,031 
1982  -  121,273 
1983  -  50,022 
I984  -  23,639 
1985  -  32,436 
570  -  1,543 
53  -  2,423 
-  870  -  2,274 
-  1,179  -  2,200 
2,481  -  1,589 
2,349  -  1,884 
-4  -  1,568 
158  -  2,644 
-  849  -  3,474 
-  2,558  -4,214 
-  375  -3,693 
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-  1,133  -  3,746 
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-  4,965  -6,131 
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-3,131  -5,523 
-3,858  -2,824 
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22,970  26,879 
21,461  10,475 
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Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Nores: The data are seasonally adjusted, except as noted; (+) = credits; (-)  = debits. 
aExcludes military. 
bAdjusted from census data for differences in valuation, coverage, and timing. 
Fees and royalties from U.S. direct investments abroad or from foreign direct investments in the United States are excluded from investment income and included in other 
services net. 
concept, balance on goods and services is equal to net exports and imports in the national income and product accounts (and the sum of balance on current account and 
allocations of special drawing rights is equal to net foreign investment in the accounts), although the series differ because of different handling of certain items (gold, capital 
gains and losses, etc.), revisions, etc. 
rlncludes extraordinary U.S. government transactions with India. 
‘Consists of gold, special drawing rights, convertible currencies, and U.S. reserve position in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 566  Jeffrey A. Frankel/Saburo Okita/Peter G. PetersodJames R. Schlesinger 
plus.  But, beginning under the Kennedy administration, capital out- 
flows became the subject of increasing concern. Under Operation Twist, 
monetary policy  sought  to raise short-term interest rates to attract 
short-term capital from abroad, at the same time as long-term interest 
rates were kept low with the aim of  stimulating investment. A series 
of increasingly strong direct controls on the outflow of capital were 
also put into place, though they were not very effective: the rise of the 
Euromarket, outside the grasp of U.S.  regulators, dates from this period. 
Much of the capital outflow took the form of  U.S.  direct investment 
in Europe and elsewhere. Outward direct investment increased from 
$2.9 billion  in  1960 to $10.2 billion  in  1970, explaining most of  the 
increase in measured private capital outflow.’  One view was that the 
United States was playing a useful role as the world’s banker: borrow- 
ing short term and lending long term. A bank does it by taking deposits 
and lending to businesses and homeowners; the world’s banker would 
do it by creating liquid dollar reserves for others to hold and investing 
in plant and equipment abroad. But some, the French in particular, 
resented the idea that Americans were buying out their factories and 
land, offering in return only paper that was less and less adequately 
backed by gold. 
9.2.3  The Breakup of the Bretton Woods System 
In the late 1960s, the U.S. balance  of payments problem  became 
more of a trade balance problem. The reason was expansionary mac- 
roeconomic policies. After  1965, military  spending increased rapidly 
because of the escalation of the Vietnam War. At the same time, do- 
mestic spending was increasing under Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society 
program. Furthermore, monetary policy accommodated the expansion, 
with  the exception of  a  couple of  brief  attempts at braking.  Rapid 
growth  in  income  resulted directly  in  rapid  growth in  imports. The 
economy also became overheated, giving rise to inflation. U.S. infla- 
tion, in a system under which the dollar was supposedly not allowed 
to devalue, resulted in a gradual loss of competitiveness by American 
firms on world  markets. In  1971, the U.S. trade balance  went into 
deficit for the first time in the postwar period. In response to the trade 
deficit and to a corresponding loss in reserves, Richard Nixon unilat- 
drally devalued the dollar in terms of both gold and foreign currencies, 
placed a tariff surcharge on imports, and ended the U.S.  government’s 
commitment to sell gold for dollars to foreign central banks. This marked 
the end of the Bretton Woods system. Most foreign central banks con- 
tinued to cooperate in the effort to prop up the system of fixed exchange 
rates, buying  up unwanted dollars.  But by now, private speculators 
knew that selling dollars was a good bet. As a result, capital outflows 
were very  high throughout the early 1970s. In the accounts in table 567  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
9.1, they show up as an increase in the rate at which U.S. residents 
acquired claims abroad (and in the statistical discrepancy). In the first 
few months of 1973, several of the major central banks had to absorb 
unprecedented quantities of dollars, with no end in  sight. In March 
1973, they ceased their commitments to buy and sell dollars at fixed 
exchange rates. In other words, the world moved from the fixed ex- 
change rate system to the current system of floating exchange rates. 
With the exchange rate now free to move, the desire of investors to 
allocate a higher proportion of their portfolios to foreign assets sud- 
denly took the form of an increase in  the price of  foreign assets in 
terms of dollars, that is, a depreciation of the dollar. The depreciation 
meant that American manufacturers and farmers could once again com- 
pete in world markets on favorable terms. The current account returned 
to surplus in the years 1973-76. 
9.2.4  Capital Outflow in the Mid-1970s 
The rate of  net private capital outflow reached a stable plateau  in 
the mid-1970s. This outflow was not primarily a sign of  lack of  confi- 
dence in the U.S. economy, as it had been in 1970-73.  Indeed, there 
were times, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the late-1973 
oil crisis, when investors increased their demand for dollar assets.* 
Rather, the United States was behaving as a mature industrialized coun- 
try generally is expected to behave: running a current account surplus 
($18.1 billion in  1975) and investing the proceeds in other countries 
where they can earn a higher rate of return. 
The financial situation began to deteriorate, however, in the latter 
half of the decade. Following the oil crisis and the 1975 world recession, 
there was concern, particularly in the United States and in developing 
countries, that worldwide saving was too high and expenditure too low 
to sustain growth. There had been a massive transfer of wealth to the 
members of OPEC, many of  whom had a high tendency to save the 
wealth rather than spend it. The United States undertook steady fiscal 
and monetary expansion, with the Europeans following only reluctantly 
and with a delay. The result was rapid growth in U.S. imports and a 
fall in the trade balance; in 1977 and 1978, the current account registered 
substantial $15 billion deficits. The Carter administration could have 
argued that the trade deficits were not cause for concern, but to the 
contrary, were precisely what was needed: The expansion in demand 
was sustaining recovery in the United  States, and at the same time 
was allowing those developing countries that were faced with sharply 
increased oil import bills to earn the foreign exchange to pay them by 
exporting to the United  States. But the record deficits did generate 
concern. In 1977-78,  as it was to again in 1985-87, the U.S. Treasury 
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to increase purchases from the United States. In both episodes, reluc- 
tant foreign governments had to face the alternative that the same goal, 
reducing the U.S. trade deficit, would instead be accomplished by an 
accelerated depreciation of the dollar. 
I will discuss in later sections the declines in real interest rates and 
in  the value of the dollar during this period. Here we note that the 
swing from surplus to deficit on the current account in  1977-78  was 
not associated with an offsetting swing from deficit to surplus on the 
private capital account. Private capital on net continued to flow out at 
a steady rate of  about $20 billion a year.3 The U.S. current account 
deficit was financed by increased holdings of  U.S. assets on the part 
of foreign central banks (“official foreign assets” in table 9.1), rather 
than on the part of foreign private citizens. Much as at the beginning 
of the decade, foreign central banks were buying dollars in an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to prevent the dollar from depreciating and their own 
currencies from appreciating. 
The depreciation of the dollar stimulated exports enough to return 
the country to a surplus in goods and services in  1979 and  1980. At 
the same time, the nature of capital flows began to change. This was 
the end of a long period of steady U.S. net investment abr~ad.~  In the 
1980s, capital on net began to flow in to finance U.S. trade deficits, 
reversing the pattern of the preceding ninety years. We will be picking 
up the story of the capital inflows in section 9.4. 
9.3  Risk, Government Controls, and Other Barriers or Incentives to 
International Capital Movements 
Many factors influence investors’ decisions to move capital inter- 
nationally. The most obvious factor is the expected rate of return that 
can be earned in one country or another. In section 9.5, we will be 
looking at various measures of rates of return in the United States and 
other major countries, with special reference to the increased attrac- 
tiveness of  U.S. assets in the early  1980s. But other factors are im- 
portant as well. Indeed, if investors cared only about expected returns 
and nothing else, then one would not observe any differentials in rates 
of return. Investors would refuse to buy the assets with the lower return 
and would have an unlimited demand for the assets with the higher 
return. In other words, arbitrage would quickly insure that expected 
returns were eq~alized.~  We  will  see in section 9.5 that this does not 
quite seem to be the case. In this section we consider factors other 
than expected rates of return: transactions costs, capital controls, taxes, 
default risk, and exchange risk. 569  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
9.3.1  Transactions Costs 
An unavoidable barrier to international capital movements is trans- 
actions costs, as represented in the case of securities by a brokerage 
fee or a bid-ask spread. But this barrier is extremely small for countries 
with developed financial markets. Several factors have worked to re- 
duce transactions costs steadily over the years.  Deregulation, inno- 
vation, and economies of  scale in international dealings, particularly 
in the Euromarket, have made the world banking and securities industry 
more efficient. Some of the many recent innovations in  international 
markets to make the issuance of securities, or the management of the 
accompanying risk, more convenient for borrowers or lenders include 
currency and interest rate swaps, dual currency issues, mismatched 
floating rate notes, zero coupon bonds, equity-related issues, note is- 
suance facilities, and Eurocommercial paper.6 Reduced telecommuni- 
cations costs and other technological advances have also been impor- 
tant. The real cost of  sending a telegraphic message from New York 
to London or Paris in  1985 was only 8-9  percent of  what it was in 
1900, and the real cost of a three-minute off-peak phone call between 
Washington and Frankfurt was only 5 percent of what it was in  1950 
(Cooper 1986, 10). 
Another factor, exchange rate variability, has worked to raise foreign 
exchange transactions costs since curencies began to float. To make a 
market in foreign exchange, banks have to take open positions in foreign 
currency, even if  only briefly, and the riskiness of doing so has gone 
up with the variability of exchange rates. As a result, bid-ask spreads 
have generally been higher since 1973 than in the past (Levich 1985, 
997-99). Nevertheless, they are still on average small-not  high enough 
to create much of a deterrent to investors’ shifting their portfolios in 
response to a change in the attractiveness of a country’s assets. 
The result of  these reduced costs is a very high volume of financial 
transactions internationally. For example, a survey by the Federal Re- 
serve Bank of New York in March 1986 documented a very high level 
of turnover in the New York foreign exchange market: $50 billion a 
day among banks, 92 percent above the previous survey in April 1983, 
and $26 billion a day among nonbank financial institutions, up 84 per- 
cent over three years earlier.’ The volume of foreign exchange trading 
was even greater in London at $90 billion a day.* 
Due to economies of  scale, transactions costs tend to be lower in 
currencies that are widely used in trade and financial transactions. The 
U.S.  dollar has been the world’s vehicle currency ever since it inherited 
the role from the pound sterling early in the century. A non-U.S. res- 
ident wishing to buy assets of a third country generally must buy dollars Table 9.2  International Bond Markets,  1982-First  Half 1986 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986" 
Eurodollar issues 
Foreign dollar issues 
Total international dollar issues 







Foreign yen issues 
Total international yen issues 







Eurodeutsche mark issues 
Foreign deutsche mark issues 
Total international deutsche mark issues 







Euro-Swiss  franc issues 
Foreign Swiss franc issues 
Total international Swiss franc issues 







Other Eurobond issues 
Other foreign bond issues 
Total other international bond issues 





















































































































































































Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Financial Statisfics 
Monthly. 
Note: Total international bond issues for 1986 was $225 billion. 
"First half  1986 annualized. 571  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
first, before converting them into the third currency. Banks and large 
corporations  around the world hold  dollar transactions  balances. In 
1985 over 60 percent of international bond issues were denominated in 
dollars, as can be seen from table 9.2. A disproportionately high share 
of world trade is also invoiced in dollars. 
Other currencies also play  a role in  international transactions.  In 
ascending order of transactions costs in the ninety-day forward mar- 
kets, as measured  by  the percentage bid-offer spread in  the period 
September 1982-December 1985, are the mark, yen, Canadian dollar, 
Dutch guilder, pound, and Swiss franc.9 This ranking of the currencies 
corresponds roughly to their ranking in volume of foreign exchange 
trading in New York: mark, yen, pound, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, 
French franc, and Dutch guilder.lO In the 1980s, there has been talk of 
the yen beginning to play a more central role. The use of the yen as a 
currency in which to invoice trade, issue bonds, and hold reserves is 
indeed increasing relative to the low levels of the past. The share of 
yen-denominated issues in international bond markets has gone from 
5.2 percent in  1982 to 10.4 percent in 1986, including many U.S. bor- 
rowers. This is now a greater share than that of the deutsche mark, as 
can be seen in table 9.2."  However, there is little prospect of the dollar 
being seriously challenged as the world's vehicle currency. 
One might also include the cost of obtaining information in the cat- 
egory of  transactions costs as another barrier discouraging residents 
of one country from holding assets in  another. Information costs are 
relevant, for example, for mortgage holdings because of the difficulty 
of  evaluating the creditworthiness  of  the borrower.  Foreigners  hold 
essentially no mortgages in the United States, while Americans in the 
aggregate hold about 25  percent of their portfolio in that form. Infor- 
mation costs are not  a problem for U.S. Treasury  securities on the 
other hand; indeed the safety and liquidity of U.S. government secu- 
rities are so attractive to foreigners that they hold about 43 percent of 
their U.S. portfolio in that form, as compared to about 21 percent for 
Americans (see table 9.3). Eurobonds issued by well-known U.S. cor- 
porations have also been very popular with foreigners in recent years 
for the same reason. 
9.3.2  Capital Controls 
In many countries, government controls have been serious barriers 
to the international flow of capital. The postwar international economic 
system established at Bretton Woods did not incorporate a presump- 
tion, analogous to the one incorporated regarding international trade, 
about the  undesirability  of government intervention in  international 
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Table 9.3  Foreign versus Domestic Holdings of Financial Assets, 1984 
(billions of dollars) 
Foreign Holders  Domestic Holders 
Amount  % of Total  Amount  % of  Total 
Checkable deposits 
Large time deposits  39.4  8.8  392.3  4.8 
Short-term U.S. 
Long-term U.S.  1,709.5  20.8 
Other short-term paper  40.9  9.1  266.4  3.2 
Corporate bonds  61.8  13.8  588.1  7.2 
State-local 
government securities  0.0  0.0  543.6  6.6 
Mortgages  0.0  0.0  2,028.9  24.7 
Corporate equities  94.5  21 .o  2,090.3  -  25.5 
and currency  $  19.7  4.4%  $  582.2  7.1% 
government securities  72.0  16.0 
government securities  120.8  26.9 
Total  449.1  100.0  8,201.3  100.0 
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Flow of  Funds, various 
issues; table from Friedman 1986. 
Nores: Amount and percentage of total are year-end figures. Short-term  U.S. government 
securities include marketable securities only. Other short-term paper includes commer- 
cial paper  and bankers  acceptances.  Foreign holdings of  corporate equities exclude 
foreign direct investment. Totals exclude small time and saving deposits, money market 
mutual funds, interbank claims, and other miscellaneous assets. 
The more common use of controls is to discourage the outflow of 
capital from a weak-currency country, as in many developing countries, 
or as in the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s. But they are 
also sometimes used to discourage capital from flowing into a country, 
when it wishes to avoid a real appreciation of its currency or is worried 
about a potential loss in monetary control. For example, Germany and 
Switzerland had special taxes on interest payments to nonresidents, 
and maintained other measures to discourage foreigners from holding 
assets in their countries, until 1975.'* Though the controls on capital 
inflow into Germany and Switzerland, like the controls on capital out- 
flow from the United States, were never very effective, their removal 
no doubt facilitated part of the increased U.S. acquisition of foreign 
assets in the mid-1970s that shows up in table 9.1. 
The United Kingdom maintained controls to discourage capital out- 
flows until 1979. But when Margaret Thatcher came to office, Britain 
too joined the club of countries with essentially open financial markets, 
which by then consisted of the United States, Canada, Germany, Swit- 
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An interesting case is Japan. Until relatively recently, Japan had very 
highly regulated capital markets, both domestically and with respect 
to international transactions. In the period 1975-78,  the Japanese con- 
trols worked to discourage capital inflow, with the aim of  dampening 
the appreciation of the yen. Foreigners were not allowed to hold gensaki 
(a three-month repurchase agreement) and other Japanese assets. That 
the controls worked to discourage capital inflow can be seen by looking 
at the differential in interest rates between gensaki in Tokyo and three- 
month Euroyen in London, which averaged  1.84 percentage points:*3 
If it were not for the controls, investors would not have been willing 
to hold Euroyen when a higher interest rate was available in Tokyo. 
When the  yen  began to depreciate  rapidly  in  1979, the Japanese 
moved quickly to remove restrictions on foreign purchases of Japanese 
assets. The differential between the gensaki and Euroyen interest rates 
dropped sharply. Indeed, the London rate exceeded the Tokyo rate 
after April 1979, although the differential was relatively small.  l4  This 
is evidence that Japanese controls on capital inflow were liberalized 
more quickly than controls on capital outflow, with the objective of 
dampening the depreciation of the yen against the dollar. If  some bar- 
riers to capital outflow had not remained, Japanese investors would 
not have been willing to hold assets in  Tokyo when a higher interest 
rate on comparable yen securities was available in London. 
A controversy  arose in  October  1983 when  some American busi- 
nessmen, alarmed by devastating competition from Japanese exporters, 
convinced top officials in the U.S. Treasury Department, despite the 
evidence just cited, that the Japanese government was still using some 
form of  capital market restrictions to keep the value of the yen lower 
than it would otherwise be. There followed a campaign by the U.S. 
government to induce the Japanese to adopt a whole list of measures 
further liberalizing their financial markets. This campaign came to frui- 
tion in the May 1984 Yen/Dollar Agreement between the U.S. Treasury 
and the Japanese Ministry of  Finance. Measures liberalizing capital 
inflows included the elimination of the “designated company” system 
that restricted foreign direct investment in eleven companies. Measures 
liberalizing capital outflows included relaxation of restrictions on non- 
resident issue of  yen bonds (called samurai bonds when  sold in the 
Japanese market), relaxation of “administrative guidance” on the part 
of the Ministry of Finance over overseas lending by Japanese banks, 
and permission to Japanese residents to purchase foreign-issued com- 
mercial paper and certificates of deposit. The Ministry of Finance re- 
tained  ceilings on foreign security holdings by  insurance companies 
and trust banks, equal to  10 percent of  total assets, until the ceilings 
began to become binding in early 1986, at which point they were raised 
to a much higher level. 574  Jeffrey A. FrankeUSaburo OkitalPeter G. PetersodJames R. Schlesinger 
The result of the liberalization was an increase in net capital outflows: 
The Japanese rate of acquisition  of  long-term assets abroad jumped 
from $32.459 billion in  1983 to $56.775 billion in  1984,15  the majority 
of it  in the form of  portfolio investment, as shown in table 9.4. The 
positive  offshore-onshore interest  differential,  which  had  been  fifty 
basis points (briefly) as recently  as November  1983, disappeared al- 
together in 1984.16 Furthermore, the yen depreciated another 8 percent 
against the dollar in  1984. In  short, the  Yen/Dollar Agreement  was 
successful at increasing Japan’s integration into world financial mar- 
kets, but not at promoting capital inflow into Japan or a short-term 
appreciation of the yen if that was its goal. 
As of  early  1986, only France, of  the largest industrial countries, 
maintained  capital controls that were clearly  binding by  the test of 
interest rate differentials.  These are controls on capital outflow that 
were tightened when the Socialists came to office in  1981. But even 
the French, like the Italians, are in  the process of  liberalizing. The 
offshore-onshore differential, which was 3.88 percent in March 1986,” 
vanished  thereafter  with  the  election  of  Jacques  Chirac,  at  least 
temporarily. 
In the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand have recently re- 
moved their capital controls, and Hong Kong and Singapore have had 
open financial markets for some time.  Elsewhere among developing 
countries, however, markets remain heavily controlled. Table 9.5 shows 
onshore-offshore interest differentials for a cross section of  twenty- 
four countries.  Many have differentials that are highly variable and 
significantly negative on average, indicating effective controls on the 
outflow of capital to the world market.ls 
9.3.3  Taxes 
Taxes are a determinant of international capital flows that might be 
considered a sort of government control. But it is more common that 
avoiding taxes is an incentive to invest abroad than paying taxes is a 
barrier to it. 
The mere fact that the citizens of one country are taxed at a higher 
rate than those of another does not necessarily create an incentive for 
capital flows, assuming both groups of citizens are taxed at the same 
rate on their foreign interest earnings as on their domestic earnings. 
But in practice, investors can sometimes evade taxes by keeping their 
money  in  tax  havens, in  the Caribbean and elsewhere.  The United 
States has to an extent played the role of tax haven in recent years. 
U.S. borrowers have offered bearer bonds, whose ownership depends 
on physical possession rather than registry, to eager investors in Europe 
and Latin America.19 
The requirement that banks hold a certain fraction of their deposits 
in the form of reserves, rather than lending them out at market interest Table 9.4  Long-Term Capital Movements in Japan (millions of  U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Bank of  Japan, Balance of Paymenfs Monthly, in OECD Economic Survey, Japan, August 1985 and November 1986. 
Nofe:  Minus sign indicates capital outflow. 
aExcluding foreign investors’ gensaki transactions (bond transactions with agreements to repurchase, usually within three months). 
Since the liberalization in 1979 up to the end of 1981, although short term in nature, those transactions had been classified as long- 
term capital movements. 
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Table 9.5  Deviations from Covered Interest Parity, September 1982 to 
October 1985, in Percentage Points (local interest ratelondon 
Eurodollar interest ratelondon forward discount) three-month 
maturity 
Root Mean 
Mean  Sample  Squared  95% 
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Source: Barclay's Bank. 
aStatistically significant at 99 percent level. 
bStatistically significant at 95 percent level. 
rates, might be thought of  as another tax. U.S. reserve requirements 
were one reason for the growth of the Euromarket in the  1960s and 
1970s. Banks do not have to hold reserves against their offshore de- 
posits and for that reason are willing to pay a higher interest rate on 
deposits in the Euromarket than on deposits in the United States. The 577  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
differential in  three-month interest  rates between the  Eurocurrency 
market and the U.S. interbank market exceeded one hundred  basis 
points in  1980, as the second column of table 9.6 indicates. 
By the early 1980s, discouraging capital ouflow was no longer a goal 
for the United  States, and authorities were concerned that the U.S. 
banking industry was losing business to Eurobanks. Beginning Decem- 
ber 1981, U.S. banks were allowed to participate in a sort of domestic 
Euromarket  by  establishing  International  Banking Facilities (IBFs), 
which are simply a separate set of  deposit accounts without reserve 
requirements.20  There followed a large shift in accounts from overseas 
offices of U.S. banks to the offices at home, the majority in New York. 
But the change is to be thought of  as a shift in the location at which 
banking services are provided, rather than as a net capital inflow: both 
claims and liabilities to foreigners were shifted to U.S. banks. 
An important factor in determining international capital flows is with- 
holding taxes. Until recently, the United States and most other major 
countries withheld income taxes on bond interest paid to foreigners, 
unless  the foreign residents  fell under bilateral  tax  treaties, on the 
theory that the income might otherwise escape taxation altogether. But 
in July  1984, the United States abolished its withholding tax.*’ This 
move was an inducement to foreign investment in the United States. 
West Germany, France, and Japan have since also found it necessary 
or desirable to abolish their own withholding taxes, in order to “remain 
competitive” in the eyes of international investors. Now most countries 
are potential tax havens for residents of other countries. 
9.3.4  Default Risk and Other “Political Risk” 
A corporation or other borrower that has a possibility of defaulting 
on its obligations has to pay a correspondingly higher interest rate to 
compensate lenders for that possibility. For example, the reason inves- 
tors in the early  1980s were willing to hold deposits in U.S. banks at 
lower interest rates than could be earned in  the Euromarket, in the 
absence of controls on capital outflow from the United States, may be 
that they thought there was a greater risk of default in the Euromarket. 
The differential between the Eurodollar and domestic deposit rates 
cannot be explained  solely by  the difference created by reserve re- 
quirements on the  side of  banks’ costs.  Figure  9.1 shows that  the 
differential existed even when the U.S. deposit rate is adjusted for 
reserve requirements. 
While U.S.  government debt has always been considered close to 
free of default risk, the 1980s debt crisis has forcefully established the 
point that governments can default. Indeed, in many Latin American 
and other financially troubled countries, government debt has turned 
out to be no more guaranteed than private debt. Even many European Offshore rate  Euro-$  Euro-$  Euro f + fd  U.K. ib  + fd  U.K. T-Bill + fd  Euro-DM + fd 






































































































































Notes:  ib = interbank rate. 




Adjusted  Domestic 
Jan-81  Jan-82  Jan-83  Jan-84  JWI-85 
Fig. 9.1  Deviations from closed interest parity offshore less domestic. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board. 
governments have to pay a default risk premium over U.S.  government 
debt, as shown in figure 9.2b below. 
One cannot look at interest rates on new bank lending to the troubled 
debtors after 1982 for a measure of the perceived probability of default. 
The banks that have large loans already outstanding, knowing that the 
likely alternative is default on the earlier debt, have “involuntarily” 
had to put in new money in  rescheduling agreements. The new loans 
have been made at interest rates that-though  maintaining positive fig- 
leaf spreads over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate)-are  far 
lower  than would  compensate  them  for the true  risk.  But one can 
estimate the perceived default risk from the discount at which loans 
trade on the secondary market. As of December 1986, bank loans were 
trading  at a discount of  32.9 percent  for a weighted  average of  15 
problem debtors, as reported in table 3.17 (Dornbusch) in this volume. 
There is also a secondary market in bonds issued by some of  these 
countries. Before August 1982, when the Mexican debt crisis first sur- 
faced, the rate of return on Mexican or Brazilian bonds was below that 
on World Bank bonds. The prices of the bonds fell to a discount there- 
after, so their rate of return rose above that on World Bank bonds. The 
difference, which  should  be  interpreted  as a default  risk  premium, 
peaked at 8.14  percent in April 1983 for Mexican bonds and 6.71 percent 
in January 1985 for Brazilian bonds (Folkerts-Landau  1985; Edwards 
1986) (see table 9.7). 
Many analysts believe that the perceived increased risk of default in 
Latin America and elsewhere in the world after August 1982 caused a 
large flow of capital to the United States, which was considered a safe Table 9.7  Default Risk Premiums on Foreign Bonds,  1981-85 (U.S. dollars) 
Returns on  Difference in 
Foreign Bonds"  Rates of  Returna 
World Bank  Mexico  Brazil 
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Table 9.7  (continued) 
Returns on  Difference in 
Foreign Bondsa  Rates of Returna 
World Bank  Mexico  Brazil 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (2) - (1)  (3) -  (1) 
1985 
November  12.71  14.00  16.58  1.29  3.87 
December  11.93  13.92  16.84  1.99  4.91 
11.02  13.28  16.85  2.26  5.83 
1985 
January  10.31  12.56  17.02  2.25  6.71 
February  10.07  12.42  12.73  2.35  2.56 
March  11.09  12.26  12.73  1.17  1.64 
Source: International Herald Tribune, various issues, in Folkerts-Landau 1985. 
Note: The bonds are medium-term seasoned bonds, January  1982-March  I  1984. 
aCall provisions on the World Bank bonds raise rates of return on these relative Mexican 
or  Brazilian bonds of  same risk  and  maturity.  Hence, the changes  over time of  the 
differences in the rates of return are of interest. 
bFor the World  Bank  10.25, June  1987; for Mexico 8.5, March  1987; for Brazil  8.25, 
December 1987. 
haven, and that this was responsible for the large appreciation of the 
dollar. That there was massive unrecorded “capital flight” out of Latin 
America is clear. Comparisons of the current account deficits of coun- 
tries such as Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina with the bank  debt 
incurred suggest that there must have been a large increase in unre- 
corded overseas claims by citizens of those countries. It is less clear 
that this explains why the demand for U.S. assets should have been 
increasing over the entire period 1981 -85,  particularly relative to Eu- 
ropean or Japanese assets, as would be necessary if it were to explain 
the appreciation of the dollar. If there was a shift during this period 
into U.S. assets based on increased perceptions of safety in the United 
States, relative to assets held in Europe, then one would expect interest 
rates on U.S. assets to decline relative to comparable dollar assets in 
Europe. This did not happen in short-term interest rates. Figure 9.1 
shows that the Eurodollar rate actually fell relative to the domestic 
U.S. deposit rate after August 1982. Table 9.6  shows that the offshore- 
onshore differential also fell by other measures between 1980-82  and 
1983-85.  The domestic interest  rate  can be measured by  the  U.S. 
Treasury bill rate instead of  by the interbank rate (first column), and 
the offshore rate can be measured in pounds or marks, covered on the 
forward exchange market, instead of by the Eurodollar rate (last five 
columns). In every case, the short-term interest differential moves in 
the opposite direction from what the safe haven hypothesis would pre- 582  Jeflkey A. FrankeUSaburo OkitalPeter G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
dict.  (In  section  9.5,  we  consider  analogous  long-term  interest 
differentials.) 
There are other kinds of  risk, besides the risk of outright default, 
that can discourage investors from holding a country’s assets. Even if 
the country does not currently have taxes on interest payments abroad, 
or on the repatriation of  profits,  and does not have controls on the 
removal of principal, there is always the possibility that it will enact 
such policies in the future. This is particularly relevant for countries 
that have had capital controls in the past. In the case of direct invest- 
ment in less developed countries, there is the possibility of nationali- 
zation of the industry. This is one of  the reasons why investment in 
these countries prior to  1982 usually took  the form of  bank  lending 
rather than direct investment. All these forms of  “political  risk”  are 
less  applicable  to  assets held  in  the  United  States than  elsewhere, 
consistent with the view of the country as a safe haven for capital. On 
the other hand, U.S. authorities have in recent years been ready to 
freeze assets of  unfriendly states Iran and Libya; Soviet fears along 
these lines thirty years ago may have been behind their decision to 
hold dollars in London banks-the  genesis of the Euromarket.22 
9.3.5  Exchange Risk 
Because of the risk of  changes in the exchange rate, assets denom- 
inated in dollars are viewed by investors as different from assets de- 
nominated  in  other currencies.  This is true even in  the absence  of 
transactions costs, capital controls, taxes, political risk, or other bar- 
riers to the movement of capital across national boundaries. 
There are many ways residents of one country can increase their net 
investment position  in  another  country without  increasing their ex- 
posure in its currency. In the first place, even if  all assets were de- 
nominated in the currency of the country where issued, U.S. residents 
could, for example, increase their net investment position abroad by 
buying back previously issued dollar bonds. A net capital outflow can 
be either an increase in foreign assets or a decrease in liabilities, as 
the high gross flow numbers in table 9.1 or 9.9 illustrate. 
In the second place,  an investor can acquire claims on foreigners 
without  the claims being denominated in  foreign currency, and  can 
acquire assets denominated  in  foreign currency  without  their being 
claims on foreigners. Many smaller countries issue bonds denominated 
in dollars, rather than in their own currencies, so that they will be more 
acceptable to international investors.23  The majority of  bank lending 
to less developed countries has been denominated in dollars, and the 
rest in the currencies of other major industrialized countries, not that 
of the borrower. Even the United States government issued  “Carter 583  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
bonds”  denominated in marks in  1978-79.  Corporations increasingly 
borrow abroad in foreign currency, either as a foreign bond issue or in 
the Euromarket. 
At the shorter end of the maturity spectrum, there have been active 
forward exchange markets for some time; borrowers are able to hedge 
foreign currency liabilities by buying exchange forward, and lenders 
to hedge foreign currency assets by selling exchange forward. At the 
longer end of  the maturity  spectrum, the rapid  growth of  currency 
swaps in the 1980s allows US.  corporations to issue Euroyen or Eu- 
romark bonds to Japanese, Germans, or anyone else wishing to hold 
these currencies, and then to swap the proceeds into dollars. Finally 
on the list of ways that currency of denomination can be divorced from 
the location of the asset, the prices of equities and direct investment 
are not fixed in any currency, either domestic or foreign (though the 
dollar price of foreign equities does often seem to move one for one 
with the exchange rate). 
While these ways exist for an investor to buy a foreign asset without 
taking a position in foreign currency, not all investors should wish to 
avoid taking such a position. Unless an investor is indifferent to risk, 
or is certain what the future exchange rate will be, or is tied to his own 
currency by accounting practices, he should wish to diversify his hold- 
ings among dollars, marks, yen, pounds, francs, and so forth so as to 
reduce the variability in the value of his overall portfolio. It is easy for 
an investor, particularly an American, to slip into the habit of viewing 
his own currency as safe and others as risky. This view would assign 
exchange risk a purely negative role, a cost to be weighed against other 
factors like expected return in the decision to buy foreign currencies. 
But the value of domestic currency is not completely safe, even for an 
American. A firm that imports raw materials, intermediate inputs, or 
other goods from abroad is vulnerable to an increase in costs from a 
depreciation of  the domestic currency; such a firm would be wise to 
take an  “open”  position  in foreign currency, that  is, to hold  some 
foreign assets or to buy some foreign exchange on the forward market. 
(The word  “open”  is in  quotations because in this case the firm is 
reducing overall exposure to currency risk, not increasing it except in 
the most narrow of accounting senses.) Households also consume some 
imported goods and thus are partially  vulnerable  to a depreciation, 
though there is generally a lag before the depreciation is passed through 
to retail prices. Furthermore, the possibility of inflation in prices of 
domestically produced goods, whether associated with a change in the 
exchange rate or not, provides another reason why the domestic cur- 
rency should not be viewed as perfectly safe. The point is that even a 
highly risk-averse American might want to hold some foreign currency 
assets. 584  Jetbey A. Frankel/Saburo Okita/Peter  G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
To citizens of smaller, more open, countries, this point is more im- 
portant. In countries with a past history of hyperinflation, particularly 
in central Europe and Latin America, the desirability of  holding some 
foreign currency is well understood even by relatively unsophisticated 
citizens. The role of  “asset least likely to lose purchasing power” has 
been played by various currencies at various times. In the 1970s,  marks 
and Swiss francs, in addition to gold, were popular. But in the 1980s, 
the U.S. dollar is the currency of choice, in large part due to the firm 
antiinflation policy of the Federal Reserve Board under Chairman Paul 
Volcker. In countries that are highly unstable monetarily, residents are 
willing to give up interest earnings on securities to hold dollars in the 
form of currency. Dollars are known to circulate freely in such countries 
as Argentina and Israel. There are no data on foreign holdings of U.S. 
currency, but Cooper (1986, 7) conjectures that over $20 billion of the 
roughly $169 billion in dollar currency in circulation at the end of 1984 
was held abroad. 
Because exchange rates have become more variable since 1973, and 
even since 1980, the typical international investor should be more di- 
versified among currencies than in the past. Despite this, and despite 
the low level of  transactions costs and capital controls among major 
industrialized countries, residents everywhere appear to hold far less 
foreign assets, and far more of their own country’s assets, than would 
be present in a theoretically  well-diversified portfolio.  For example, 
table 9.8 suggests that most U.S.  assets are still held by U.S.  residents. 
Similarly, most Japanese assets are still held by  Japanese residents, 
and so forth. But investors everywhere are increasing their level of 
diversification, which explains why U.S.  residents are increasing their 
gross claims on foreigners even at a time when capital is on net flowing 
into the  United  States (table 9.9). This process can be expected to 
continue for many years. 
9.4  U.S. Capital Inflows in the 1980s 
The 1980s have witnessed a historic swing in the U.S.  capital account. 
In  1980, U.S. residents were on net investing overseas, as they had 
for many decades, at a rate estimated in the last line of table 9.9 at 
$10.4 billion a year. By  1982, U.S. residents appear to have been on 
net borrowing from abroad, at a rate of $10.5 billion a year. The esti- 
mated rate of net borrowing rose very rapidly, to $41.8 billion in 1983 
and $106.5 billion in 1984, until it reached an apparent plateau in  1985 
of  $122.9 billion.24 During this  same period,  the dollar appreciated 
sharply. 
The balance of  payments statistics in table 9.9 give some (limited) 
insight into the composition of  the net capital inflow. The inflow has 
primarily taken the form of foreigners increasing their holdings of U.S. 585  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
Table 9.8  Foreign Holdings of U.S. Financial Assets, 1962-85 
Amount  Total 
at Year End  U.S.  Market" 





































Source: Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Flow of  Funds Accounts, 
Financial Assets and Liabilities, September 1986, pp. 1-2,  15- 16. 
aTotal credit market debt owed by nonfinancial sectors plus security credit, trade credit, 
mutual fund shares, and other corporate equities. 
assets. U.S. residents have not noticeably cashed in their holdings of 
foreign assets. In fact, U.S. residents have continued to increase their 
investments abroad. 
9.4.1  U.S.  Assets Abroad 
Some have argued that the sharp fall in the recorded rate of  U.S. 
acquisition of foreign assets, from $1 10.2 billion in 1982 to $15.0 billion 
in  1984 and $25.8 billion in 1985, means that actions by U.S. residents 
are dominating the net capital inflow, not actions by foreign residents.25 
But there are several things to be said against this argument. First, the 
recorded stock of  U.S. assets abroad continues to rise; it is only the 
rate of  change that has declined. Second, part of the apparent fall in 
U.S. investment abroad is an apparent fall in foreign direct investment 
between  1980 and 1982-84 (line 5 in table 9.9; the recorded figure for 
1982 even shows a net decrease in the U.S. foreign direct investment 
position). But this fall in recorded direct investment is in  part due to 
the problem of U.S.  corporations obtaining funds via subsidiaries in 
the Netherlands Antilles. When these credit items are moved from the 
direct investment numbers to foreign purchases of U.S. corporate se- 
curities where they belong, foreign direct investment shows less of a 
decline in the early 1980~.*~ 
In the third place, and quantitatively much more important, the re- 
ported slowdown in the period 1983-85  in U.S. banks' acquisition of 
claims on foreigners (line 8 in table 9.9) relative to  1981-82  can be 
traced to exaggeration of the 1981-82  figures by the establishment of 
IBFs (international banking facilities) in the United  States beginning Table 9.9  Capital Flows in the Balance of Payments, 1980-85  (billions of  dollars) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
(1) U.S. assets abroad, net 
(increaseicapital outflow [  -1) 
(2)  U.S. official reserve 
(3)  Other U.S. government 




(5)  Direct investment 





(6)  Foreign securities 
(7)  Other claims reported 
by U.S. nonbanks 
(8) Other claims reported 
by U.S. banks 
(9)  Foreign assets in the U.S. 
net (increasekapital  inflow 
[+I) 
(10)  Foreign official assets in 
(1  1)  Other foreign assets in 
the U.S. 
the U.S. 
(12)  Direct investment 
(13)  U.S. Treasury 
securities 
-  86.1 
-  8.2 
-  5.2 
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20.5 (14) Other U.S. 
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(15) Other liabilities 
reported by U.S. 
nonbanks 
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reported by U.S. 
banks 
(17) Current account balance 
(18) Recorded nonofficial capital 
account balance 
(3) +  (4) +  (1) 
(19) Adjusted direct 
investment balance 
(5) +  (12) -  (5a) 
(20) Adjusted securities 
balance 
(6) +  (13)  +  (14) +  (5a) 
(21) Other claims and 
liabilities 
(3) +  (7) +  (8) +  (15) +  (16) 
Official reserves (2) +  (10) 
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Sources:  Survey of Current Business,  June 1986, table  1; for 5a.  1980-81,  Survey of Currenr business, 
June 1983, table D;  1982, (revised) Department of  Commerce;  1983-85,  Survey of  Currenr Business, 
June 1986, table D. 
"Assumes statistical discrepancy is entirely unrecorded capital inflows. 588  Jeffrey A. FrankellSaburo Okita/Peter G. PetersonlJames  R. Schlesinger 
in  December  1981. About  $44 billion  of IBF liabilities to foreigners 
originated in  1981, and $72 billion in  1982. Since these increased lia- 
bilities  were matched  by  increased claims when the accounts were 
moved from overseas, the acquisition of foreign  assets reported by 
U.S. banks is estimated to have been exaggerated by these amounts.27 
Thus, the decline in  acquisition  of foreign assets in  the subsequent 
years is  exaggerated  similarly. More generally  in  the case of  bank- 
reported flows, the statistics need say nothing about the residence of 
investors on whose behalf  the banks are reporting. In the case of 
interbank transactions, the distinction between increases in liabilities 
and decreases in claims is particularly lacking in economic significance. 
9.4.2  Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
The side of the balance  sheet covering foreign investments in the 
United  States is perhaps the more interesting,  as the country is be- 
coming  increasingly  dependent on the  willingness  of  foreigners  to 
continue to increase their lending. From lines  11 to 16 in  table 9.9, 
foreign  acquisition  of  U.S.  assets  during  1983-85  consisted of  18 
percent  direct investment,  17  percent  purchases  of  U.S. Treasury 
securities, 24  percent purchases of other securities, 1 percent other 
U.S. liabilities to unaffiliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking 
concerns, and 40 percent U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks not 
included elsewhere. 
Table 9.10 shows the foreign direct investment position in the United 
States at the end of  1985. The investment is mostly in the hands of 
Europeans: 66 percent. Nine percent is held by Canada, 10 percent by 
Japan, 9 percent by Latin America, and only 5 percent by the Middle 
East and all others. The largest category is in manufacturing (33 per- 
cent), followed by trade (18 percent), petroleum (15 percent), real estate 
(10 percent), banking (6 percent), insurance (6 percent), other finance 
(3 percent), and other industries (8 percent). 
A highly publicized component of foreign direct investment in the 
United States is the purchase or construction of factories by foreign 
manufacturers to avoid current or threatened U.  S. restrictions against 
imports, most notably in the Japanese automobile industry. Japanese 
direct investment is indeed increasing rapidly:  $3.1 billion in  1985 on 
U.S.  figures,  or $5.4 billion  on Japanese accounting. But  it  is  still 
relatively small, and it is concentrated in trade and in financial services. 
The Japanese figures show that 68 percent of the (cumulative) direct 
investment  in  North America is in  nonmanufacturing  industries and 
only 29 percent in manufacturing industries  (5  percent in transportation 
machinery and 8 percent in electrical machinery).28  This is in contrast 
to U.S. direct investment in other countries which as of end-1985 was 
41  percent in  manufacturing,  25  percent in petroleum, and  only  16 Table 9.10  Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States at Year End (millions of dollars) 
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181 Table 9.10  (continued) 
1984 
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11,844  6,847 
165  404 
8,961  1,873 
1,132  790 
7,431  778 
398  305 
2,621  11,822 
747  (d) 
5,558  2,099 
803  190 
842  1 I3 
-  39  78 
4,755  1,909 
955  (d) 
3,717  1,364 
63  190 
19  (d) 
58  (d) 
54  (d) 
3  (4 
171  23 I.. 
-  36  (d) 
_. 
Source: Survey of Current Business. 
*Less than $500,000( +). 
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percent in banking, finance, and insurance. (U.S direct investment in 
Japan is 51 percent in  manufacturing,  24 percent in  petroleum, and 
only 8 percent in banking, finance, and in~urance.)~~  Japanese direct 
investment in manufacturing  in the United  States may be important 
for redirecting trade flows, or for any transfer of managerial practices 
that may be taking place, but it is not a quantitatively substantial part 
of  the capital inflow into the United States.3” 
9.4.3  Securities Sales versus Banking Flows 
In  the past, banking  transactions have generally  been the largest 
component of the capital account. But in 1984, foreign purchases of 
U.S.  securities passed bank-reported liabilities as the largest compo- 
nent of the capital inflow, either on a gross or net basis. 
This trend, which accelerated in  1985, partly reflects  the securiti- 
zation of international capital markets: the rapidly growing role of direct 
investor purchases of bonds and equities, at the expense of  bank in- 
termediation.  Some of the reasons suggested for the decline in bank- 
ing’s share are deregulation and innovation in securities markets, con- 
cern over  bank exposure to developing countries, the pressure on banks 
to increase their capital-asset ratio, and concern over the Continental 
Illinois  Bank  crisis in  1984.31  A  rapidly  growing component of  the 
increased  purchases of securities  by foreigners consists of issues of 
Eurobonds by U.S. corporations: $38 billion in  1985 as compared to 
$7 billion in 1983.32  Purchases of all nowTreasury U.S. securities reached 
$50.9 billion in 1985, over nine times higher than the level of five years 
earlier. 
Another large  chunk is  increased  purchases of  U.S. government 
bonds. In 1984 the U.S. Treasury began  a new effort to tap foreign 
savings and help finance the enormous federal budget deficit by issuing 
“foreign-targeted  registered  obligations”  directly  into the Eurobond 
market. Foreign  purchases of  all  Treasury  securities  reached $20.5 
billion in  1985, almost eight times higher than the level of five years 
earlier.  A  remarkable  83 percent of  the foreign purchases were by 
Japanese residents.33 This reflects the magnitude of the capital inflow 
from Japan and the relative preference of Japanese investors for U.S. 
bonds rather than equities. In 1986, however, foreign purchases of U.S. 
equities picked up sharply, surpassing purchases of U.S. Treasury se- 
curities as a component of the capital inflow. 
9.4.4  Official Reserve Holdings of Dollars 
Until  1973, the holdings of international reserves by central banks 
were thought  of as endogenous, as accommodating  the decisions  of 
private residents regarding either investment or current account trans- 
actions. With the end of the Bretton Woods system, the obligation for 
the major central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market 593  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
ended. Most continued to intervene as it suited them, the European 
and Japanese central banks much more so than the U.S. authorities. 
For example, their purchases of dollars to try to dampen the dollar 
depreciation of  1977-78  were  several times greater than  the record 
U.S. current account deficits.  One could think  of the major central 
banks during this period playing to an extent the same role they did 
under the Bretton Woods system: financing U.S.  current account (and 
private capital account) imbalances. 
In the early 1980s, as the dollar swung from a level perceived as too 
low to a level perceived as too high, the European and Japanese central 
banks reversed the direction of their intervention, now selling dollars 
to dampen the depreciation of  their own currencies. But even in 1985, 
when the U.S Treasury under Secretary James Baker abandoned its 
previous policy of benign neglect and spearheaded a new cooperative 
effort to get the dollar down, the quantity of intervention was relatively 
small. Reported U.S.  liabilities to official institutions in Western Europe 
fell by only $7.3 billion between the end of  1980 and the end of 1985.34 
Dollar holdings by most smaller central banks increased steadily over 
this period (except in  1985): they either were unconcerned about the 
strength of  the dollar or viewed themselves as too small to affect it, 
and were more interested in  the high rates of return they could earn 
on dollar securities. The result was the positive numbers in line 10 of 
table 9.9. 
The U.S. statistics probably  underestimate the  dollar holdings of 
central banks, those in developing countries in particular, because they 
do not count Eurodollar holdings. Statistics on reserve  holdings re- 
ported by the central banks themselves show greater increases in quan- 
tity terms in 1983-85.35 It is as if central banks in the aggregate acted 
like “destabilizing speculators,’’ rather than  “leaning into the wind” 
to resist swings in the dollar.36  The tendency for central banks to shift 
their portfolios in the same direction that currency values are already 
moving is necessarily even stronger when reserves are reported in value 
terms.  As table 9.11  shows, the  share of  official reserve  portfolios 
allocated to dollars declined rapidly from 1977 to 1980, and then rose 
from  1980 to 1984, like the value of the dollar itself. Perhaps central 
banks should be lumped together with other foreign residents in their 
portfolio behavior.  37 
At the Plaza Accord of September 22, 1985, the five largest central 
banks agreed to coordinated intervention in order to bring down the 
dollar. Subsequently, when foreign central banks became convinced 
that the dollar depreciation threatened to go too far (e.g., at the Louvre 
Meeting of February 22, 1987), they switched back to purchasing dol- 
lars. The magnitude of the intervention in 1986-87 was large. In 1987:I, 
foreign official purchases of  U.S. assets even exceeded private pur- 
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70.9  66.6  66.3  60.1  67.1  66.5  68.0  69.2  67.5  67.5 
2.8  3.2  3.4  5.4  3.8  4.4  4.8  4.8  4.7  4.7 
13.3  15.9  16.2  16.7  13.9  13.3  11.1  10.6  10.9  10.9 
2.3  2.3  2.2  3.1  2.5  2.4  2.0  1.9  2.1  2.1 
3.9  3.6  3.8  4.9  3.9  3.9  3.6  3.0  3.1  3.1 
1.2  1.5  1.6  2.0  1.6  1.7  1.3  1.0  1.1  1.1 
3.2  4.9  4.8  5.6  5.0  5.1  4.9  5.3  6.5  6.5 
2.5  1.9  1.7  2.2  2.2  2.8  4.2  4.1  4.0  4.0 
Source: International  Monetary  Fund, Annual Report, 1986. 
Notes: Starting with  1979, the SDR value of European currency units (ECUs) issued against U.S.  dollars is added to the 
SDR value of U.S. dollars, but the SDR value of ECUs issued against gold is excluded from the total distributed here. Only 
selected countries that provide information about the currency composition of their official holdings of foreign exchange are 
included in this table. 
"The column is for comparison and indicates the currency composition of reserves when holdings of ECUs are treated as a 
separate reserve asset, unlike the earlier columns starting with 1979 as is explained in the preceding note. The share of ECUs 
in total foreign exchange holdings was 10.9 percent for all countries and 20.2 percent for the industrial countries in  1985. 
bThis residual is equal to the difference between  total identified  reserves and the sum of the reserves between the seven 
currencies listed in the table. 
CThe  calculations  here rely to a greater extent on Fund staff estimates than do those provided for the group of  industrial 
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9.5  Rates of  Return 
What could cause swings in net capital flows of the magnitude seen 
in the 1980s? From the standpoint of macroeconomic policy, the most 
important determinants of capital flows between countries are expected 
rates of return. U.S. interest rates increased sharply after 1980. Interest 
rates in other major industrialized countries also increased, but not as 
much. The differential between the U.S. ten-year interest rate and a 
weighted average of  other countries’ ten-year interest rates averaged 
zero in  1976-80,  but rose to about 2 percent by 1982, and rose further 
to about 3 percent in 1984. This increase in the differential rate of return 
on U.S. assets is widely considered the most important cause of the 
net capital inflow that began in the early 1980s. But measuring expected 
rates of return is not as straightforward as might appear. For equities 
or direct investment, the rate of return is uncertain, and investors treat 
such assets as different from bonds so that one cannot use the bond 
interest rate to measure their expected rate of return. Even for deposits, 
loans, and bonds, where the nominal interest rate is known in terms 
of domestic currency, the dollar interest rate on U.S. bonds cannot be 
directly compared with the mark interest rate on German bonds because 
of the likelihood of future changes in the mark-dollar exchange rate. 
9.5.1  Dollar Bond Rates in the Domestic and Euro Markets 
If  we are interested in  the investor’s decision whether to invest in 
bonds issued in the United States versus bonds issued in other political 
jurisdictions per se, rather than necessarily dollar bonds versus other 
currencies, then we can get around the problem of exchange rate un- 
certainty by comparing U.S interest rates to Eurodollar interest rates. 
This is the same thing we did in table 9.7 for three-month deposit rates. 
Figure 9.2 shows four series of long-term dollar interest rates, two on 
each side of  the Atlantic. The dominant impression is that the rates 
move together, suggesting that capital controls or political risk is rel- 
atively unimportant and that arbitrage works relatively well. But there 
is still some variation in the differential. 
Figure 9.2a shows the domestic U.S. versus Eurodollar interest rate 
on bonds issued by U.S. corporations. In the mid-l970s, the rates were 
essentially the same. The domestic U.S. interest rates began to rise, 
especially in 1980 and 1981, providing a strong incentive for capital to 
flow from the Euromarket into the United States. The Eurobond rate 
also rose, but not  by  as much. The differential, represented  by  the 
solid line in figure 9.2c, reached  3.3 percent in July  1981. Evidently, 
the capital inflow was not large enough to arbitrage it away. It is unclear 
why U.S. corporations did not elect to do even more of their borrowing 
in the Euromarket at the cheaper rate.38 597  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
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Fig. 9.2  Domestic U.S. and  Eurodollar  corporate bond  rates, gov- 
ernment  bond  rates,  and  differentials.  Source:  Morgan 
Guaranty. 
Figure 9.2b shows the U.S. and Eurodollar interest rates for gov- 
ernment bonds. These Eurodollar bonds are issued by European gov- 
ernments, so the fact that they offered a higher interest rate than the 
U.S.  bonds in the 1970s was presumably compensation for somewhat 
greater risk of  default.  But when the U.S. rate rose in  1980-81,  the 
Euromarket rate lagged behind, just as with the corporate bonds; the 
differential turned positive and reached 1.7 percent in September 1981. 
When the U.S. corporate and government interest rates fell in mid- 
1982, the respective Eurobond rates again lagged behind and the dif- 
ferentials returned to their earlier levels. The drop in the Euro-U.S. 
long-term differentials in mid-1982 is consistent with the idea that inves- 
tors sought to shift their portfolios into U.S. assets for "safe  haven" 
reasons associated with the Latin American debt crisis.39  But the evi- 
dence is also consistent with the idea that there was a (short) lag in 
the time necessary for U.S. borrowers to take full advantage of  the 
lower interest rates  in  the  Euromarket  and thus arbitrage away the 
differential. Swaps, note issuance facilities, and other innovations to 
facilitate borrowing in the Euromarket were developing at this time. 598  Jeffrey A. Frankel/Saburo Okita/Peter G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
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9.5.2  U.S.  versus Nondollar Interest Rates 
Figure 9.3a shows the differential between the U.S. long-term gov- 
ernment bond rate and a weighted average of six trading partners' long- 
term government bond rates (solid line).40 The differential peaked in 
June 1984 at 3.19 percent, with the differentials against Germany and 
Japan somewhat higher. It then declined over the subsequent two years, 
falling below 1.00 percent in  1986, though still 2.0 percent against Ger- 
many and 2.8 percent against Japan as of  September 1986. 
When comparing incentives to invest in U.S.-  versus foreign-cur- 
rency bonds, we must consider exchange rate expectations in addition 
to interest rates. This is difficult because there are many different views 
as to how exchange rates move and no way to measure expectations 
directly. But it is possible to get a rough handle on the exchange rate 
expectations that investors must have held during this period. 
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There is a historical tendency, albeit very slow and erratic, for the 
exchange rate eventually to return  to a long-run equilibrium in  real 
terms (that is, adjusted for changes in the price level). The large ap- 
preciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1984,35 percent against a weighted 
average of fifteen trading partners’ currencies, was not much offset by 
higher inflation abroad, and so constituted a similar appreciation in real 
terms, 32 percent.41  The result of this loss of competitiveness was the 
rapidly growing trade deficit, which reached $113 billion in  1984 and 
$124 billion (on a balance of payments basis) in 1985. It was widely 
believed at this time that the trade situation was unsustainable, that 
the dollar was overvalued and would in the future have to depreciate 
back to levels at which U.S. producers could compete on world mar- 
kets. Such expectations of future depreciation must have had an effect 
on investor thinking. 
There exist surveys of  the forecasts made  by  participants  in the 
foreign exchange market, and they tend to confirm the idea that the 
large appreciation of the dollar in the early  1980s generated an antic- 
ipation of a future depreciation back to equilibrium. One survey con- 
ducted by the American Express Bank Review shows that the forecasted 
depreciation of the dollar one year ahead climbed from approximately 
zero in the late 1970s (- 0.20 on average in 1976-79) to a peak of 8.47 
percent in the year 1984. Another survey conducted by The Economist 
Financial Report (beginning only in 1981) shows the forecasted depre- 
ciation of the dollar rising to 10.02 per annum in 1984. A third survey, 
by  Money  Market  Services, Inc., (beginning in  1983)  shows three- 
month-ahead forecasts of  dollar depreciations rising to 7.26 percent 
(per  annum)  in  1984.42  It  seems unlikely that  investors  based  their 
portfolio decisions on the full magnitude of the expectation depreciation 
numbers reported in the surveys; since the expected depreciation num- 
bers were considerably in excess of the interest differential, there would 
not be much incentive for investors to hold dollar assets. It is likely 
that investors at each point  assigned a significant probability  to the 
possibility that the forecasted fall in the dollar would not materialize 
in the coming year, as was reasonable given that such forecasts had 
turned out wrong for four years. In that case the rising interest differ- 
ential could have been an adequate offset for expected depreciation, 
providing adequate incentive for investors to continue to increase their 
holdings of dollar securities in the 1981-84 period. 
Given our argument that investors expect deviations from long-run 
equilibrium such as the 1984 overvaluation of the dollar to be corrected, 
investors’ expectations of future depreciation should have diminished 
after March  1985 when the dollar depreciation finally took place. In 
other words, if  one thinks, as of  the end of  1986, that much of the 
return to equilibrium has already taken place, then one should think 600  Jeffrey A. Frankel/Saburo Okita/Peter G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
that less depreciation remains to be accomplished in the future. The 
survey data confirm this, as can be seen by the dashed line in figure 
9.3~.  For example, the Economist  survey showed an expected one- 
year depreciation of the dollar against the mark of only 4.9 percent as 
of October 30, 1986, as compared to 9.3 percent on September 5, 1985, 
just before the Plaza Accord (or 10.7 percent on average between June 
1981 and December 1985). The 1985-86  decline in  the expected rate 
of future depreciation explains how foreign residents would have wished 
to continue increasing their holdings of dollar assets despite the decline 
in the nominal interest differential shown in figure 9.4a. 
A useful alternative way to measure the expected rates of return on 
different countries’ assets is to look at the differential in real interest 
rates, that is, nominal interest rates adjusted for expected inflation.43 
There is no unique way of measuring expected inflation, but the prob- 
lem is not as difficult as measuring expected exchange rate changes. 
Alternative possible measures of expected inflation tend to give similar 
answers. 
During the late 1970s, and through 1980, the U.S. real interest rate 
by the available measures was usually below foreign real interest rates. 
As figure 9.3a shows, the real interest differential increased in the early 
1980s even more than did the nominal interest differential, and peaked 
in June 1984.44  Depending on whether expected inflation is measured 
by a three-year distributed lag on actual inflation, the three-year fore- 
cast of Data Resources, or the two-year forecast of the OECD Eco- 
nomic  Outlook, the  average long-term real  interest  differential rose 
between  1979-80  and  1983-84  by 4.79 percentage points, 3.88 per- 
centage points,  or 3.54  percentage points.45 This increase in  return 
differentials was a significant inducement to demand for U.S. assets. 
9.5.3  U.S. versus Foreign Returns on Equity 
To compare countries’ rates of return on real capital we can look at 
the earnings-to-price ratio or dividend-to-price ratio on equity. These 
numbers are already expressed as real rates of return and need not be 
corrected for inflation. They are reported for stock markets in Europe, 
the Far East, and Australia, in addition to the United States, by Capital 
International Perspective of Geneva.46 
The difference in the rate of  return on equity between  the United 
States and abroad is shown in figure 9.4. Like the real interest differ- 
entials, the measures of  return on equity show a substantial increase 
from  1980 to  1984, with a dip in-between at  1983. The difference in 
dividend yields rose from 1.  I  in 19804’ to 2.3 at the first peak in mid- 
1982, and 2.1 at the second peak in early 1984. The difference in earn- 
ings-price ratios followed a  similar pattern,  but  with larger  swings, 
rising from 1.6 on average in 1980 to 5.6 at the first peak in early 1982, Fig. 9.4 
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and 3.9 in  mid-1984. Both the dividend yield and the earnings-price 
ratio show the differential between the United States and foreign equity 
markets declining in  1985 and 1986. As of  1987, the rate of  return on 
U.S. equities was still perceived as high, particularly relative to Jap- 
anese equities, attracting new foreign money into the U.S. stock mar- 
ket. The same could have been said for U.S. real estate. 
To summarize the results on various assets, they generally show that 
the low or negative differentials  in  the rates of  return  between the 
United States and other countries in the late 1970s turned to substantial 
positive differentials in the early  1980s. Since the dollar was weak in 
the late 1970s and strong in the early 1980s, the evidence supports the 
argument that the change in return differentials induced a shift in inves- 
tor preferences, away from foreign assets and toward U.S. assets. One 
dent in the simplicity of this story is the dip in return differentials from 
mid-1982 to 1983, while the dollar was still appreciating.  Some argue 
that this may have been due to safe haven effects associated with the 
debt crisis. The other problem of  timing is that the second peak  in 
return differentials occurred nine months before the dollar peaked in 
March 1985. It is possible that a “speculative bubble” was driving the 
dollar during that short period, with investors increasing their demand 
for dollars due to short-term expectations of  continued appreciation 
formed  by  extrapolating past  trends.48 But the subsequent  1985-86 
decline in the value of the dollar, simultaneous with continued declines 
in  all of  the measures of return differentials,  supports the causal re- 
lationship between the two. 
9.6  Saving, Investment, and U.S. Macroeconomic Policies 
If  rates of  return have been  the driving force behind  international 
capital flows and the exchange rate, what is the driving force behind 
rates of  return? 
Interest rates and securities prices are determined by many factors. 
Particularly on a daily or monthly basis, corresponding fluctuations in 
the market-clearing price will result from whatever unpredictable fluc- 
tuations in demand for an asset occur. Interest rate volatility has been 
even higher in the  1980s than previously. This is partly the result of 
deregulation and innovation in world financial markets. However, the 
dominant source of the longer-term swings in the real rates of return 
discussed in the preceding section appears to be domestic: U.S. mac- 
roeconomic politices. So far in the 1980s, international capital markets 
have worked to dampen swings in U.S. rates of return, rather than 
working as a source of disturbances. But in  the future, US. interest 
rates will increasingly be determined at the mercy of foreign investors. 603  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
9.6.1  Monetary Policy 
In the latter half of the 1970s, expansionary monetary policy on the 
part of the Federal Reserve Board drove down U.S. real interest rates. 
That  is, even though nominal  interest  rates were  at high levels by 
historical standards, the expected inflation rate was also very high, so 
the difference of  the two was low, even negative. Toward the end of 
the decade, public concern shifted toward the inflation problem and 
away from employment and growth, which had turned out to be sur- 
prisingly steady. The Fed tried to brake the rapid rate of money growth, 
particularly after Paul Volcker was appointed chairman, but with no 
success at first. Monetarist economists charged that the problem was 
the Fed’s use of the nominal interest rate as an intermediate target, as 
opposed to the supply of bank reserves or the monetary base, which 
was argued to be evidence of a lack of true commitment to the yearly 
announced target for growth in the aggregate money supply (Ml). By 
October 1979 Volcker had decided that interest rates would have to be 
allowed to rise much more sharply if  money growth and the inflation 
rate were to be reduced. He went along with the monetarists to the 
extent of announcing that the Fed would no longer target the interest 
rate on federal funds, even on a short-term basis, but would instead 
target reserves. This was  a convenient way of  tightening monetary 
policy without taking the political heat for higher interest rates. Interest 
rates have been significantly more volatile ever since (though the var- 
ious measures of the money supply have also been more variable than 
before). 
With a small lag, the new policy produced the anticipated reduction 
in  demand  for goods when interest rates shot up, particularly after 
credit controls were imposed in March 1980. After the brief 1980 reces- 
sion had passed, monetary policy was  tightened  anew, and interest 
rates climbed further. The period of dollar appreciation dates from this 
time. The second, more serious, recession began in mid-1981. A major 
consequence of  the higher degree of  international capital mobility in 
the  1980s compared to earlier decades is that  changes in monetary 
policy operate strongly through the exchange rate and foreign demand 
for U.S. products, rather than  solely through the interest  rate and 
domestic demand. 
Although nominal interest  rates  had reached  a plateau,  and even 
dropped discretely in August 1982 when the Federal Reserve responded 
to the Mexican debt crisis and general macroeconomic conditions by 
increasing money growth, inflation was coming down. Thus, long-term 
real interest rates continued their general upward trend through mid- 
1984, with the further consequences for the behavior of international 
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Money growth  by  the conventional measures  has  been  relatively 
rapid ever since the recession; M1 grew  10.3 percent per year from 
1982: 2 to 1986: 2.49 For the first four years after the acceleration began, 
the monetarists warned that inflation would resurge with the customary 
six- to eighteen-month  lag. Volcker publicly justified  exceeding the 
yearly money targets by pointing to exogenous shifts in velocity (de- 
fined as the relationship between the money supply and dollar GNP). 
The exogenous shifts were at first identified as the special factors of 
maturing All-Savers’ Certificates and the nationwide legalizing of  in- 
terest on checking accounts, then more generally as the environment 
of  deregulation  and innovation  in  the banking industry.  An  equally 
important reason for allowing faster growth in the money numbers was 
the endogenous shift in velocity that occurs when people wish to hold 
more money because expected inflation and nominal interest rates have 
fallen. 
In the event, Volcker was right and the monetarists were  wrong. 
Inflation did not reignite during this period. Even with the recovery of 
real economic activity  that began in  1983, which proceeded rapidly 
until mid-1984 and then continued at a considerably slower pace through 
1986, nominal GNP grew more  slowly than  the  money  supply:  8.0 
percent per year from  1982:II to 1986:II (Economic Indicators,  Sep- 
tember  1986). Thus velocity grew at 2.3  (= 10.3 -  8.0) percent per 
year, in contrast to its past  historical pattern  of declining  roughly 3 
percent per year. If  the Federal Reserve had followed the explicit mo- 
netarist prescription of rigidly precommitting to a money growth rate 
lower than that of  the preceding period, say 3 percent, and velocity 
had followed the same path, then nominal GNP would have risen at 
only 0.7 per year. This is an upper bound, because with even lower 
inflation than occurred, velocity  would almost certainly have fallen 
even more than it did. The implication seems clear that the 1981-82 
recession would have lasted another four years. 
9.6.2  Corporate Tax Policy and Investment 
If the velocity-adjusted growth rate of money was not unreasonably 
high after 1982, neither was it low. How do we explain the fact that 
the long-term real interest rate in mid-1984 was as high as or higher 
than it was in mid-1982? Or that even in  1987 it was still higher than 
in  1980? 
Think of  the real interest rate being determined so that the funds 
needed for investment do not exceed the funds available from saving, 
the investment rate depending negatively on the real interest rate, and 
the national saving rate also depending (presumably positively) on the 
real interest rate.50  (Investment is defined as additions to business plant 
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saving is defined as private saving plus public saving.) Then the increase 
in real interest rates could be due either to an upward shift in invest- 
ment, a downward shift in national saving, or some combination of the 
The productivity  slowdown of  the  1970s convinced many that en- 
hanced  incentives to capital formation  were  called for,  and Ronald 
Reagan was elected in  1980 in  part on that platform.52  The 1981  tax 
bill granted liberalized depreciation allowances (ACRS, the accelerated 
cost recovery system) and a liberalized investment tax credit. When 
investment grew rapidly in 1983-84,  some claimed that the tax incen- 
tives, together with the more general probusiness climate (a “golden 
age of  capitalism”), was responsible, and that the demand for funds 
to finance the investment boom in turn explained the increase in real 
interest rates and the net capital inflow. The argument seemed to fit in 
well with the safe haven explanation for the strength of the dollar. The 
main problem with it is that the investment rate always rises in ex- 
pansions, and the increase in the 1983-84 recovery was no greater than 
the decrease in the 1981-82 recession.53  By 1985 the investment rate 
had merely reattained the approximate level of the 1970s, as table 9.12 
shows. A second argument is that calculations of the benefits of the 
tax incentives suggest that (1) they were smaller than the increase in 
real interest rates, so that the after-tax real cost of capital to firms was 
not reduced, and (2) the investment boom was concentrated in sectors 
like office computers, where the tax incentives were not very relevant 
and a technological explanation seems to fit instead.54 
Ironically, the Treasury tax reform plan of December 1984, and the 
revised tax reform plan actually passed by Congress and signed by the 
president in  1986, sharply raised corporate taxes. The logic was that 
raising corporate  tax revenue was the only way to change personal 
income tax brackets and deductions in such a way as to leave a majority 
of taxpayers feeling that they were better off, and simultaneously main- 
tain overall “revenue neutrality.”  But the effect was to undo the in- 
centives to investment enacted in 1981. 
First, we consider investment. 
9.6.3  Budget Deficit 
Having found that there has been no increase in the investment rate, 
relative to the 1970s, to explain by itself the high level of real interest 
rates  and the high capital inflow in  the mid-l980s, we  now turn  to 
national saving.55  We  begin with the “dissaving”  of the government, 
that is, the budget deficit. 
The federal budget has not been in surplus since 1969. In the 1975 
recession, the budget deficit reached the then postwar record high of 
3.5 percent of GNP. Steady growth in national income over the next Table 9.12  U.S. Net Savings and Investment as Percentages of GNP,  1951-85 
1951-60  1961-70  1971-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Total net saving 
Net private saving 
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four years raised tax revenues and reduced the deficit to 1.5 percent 
of GNP, or $38 billion, by 1979. But this was still considered too high. 
The improbable Laffer curve theory, which held that a reduction in 
personal income tax rates would stimulate production and income so 
much as to raise total tax revenues rather than lower them, helped 
convince politicians to enact large tax cuts in 1981, to be installed over 
three years. At the same time, some categories of  domestic spending 
were cut sharply, but they were a relatively  small part of  the total. 
Given the enormous buildup in military expenditure, the exemption of 
social security benefits from cuts, the runaway increases in some other 
categories like farm support, and the exogenous fact of enormous in- 
terest payments on the national debt, it was inevitable that the federal 
budget deficit would soar to unprecedented levels. Initially it was pos- 
sible to blame the increased budget deficit on the reduced tax revenues 
from the 1981-82 recession. It was claimed that rapid growth in income 
and therefore in tax revenues would return the budget to balance in a 
few years. But the tax rate cuts and spending increases were phased 
in as quickly as income grew. The deficit reached $208 billion in 1983- 
more than three times the “intolerably high” levels of the late 1970s- 
and remained in the vicinity of $200 billion for the following three years. 
The increase in the federal deficit relative to the 1970s was 3.0 percent 
of GNP, as table 9.12 shows. 
State and local governments in the aggregate improved their surplus 
by about $30 billion between  1980 and 1985 (Economic Report ofthe 
President  1986, 284), or by 0.5 percent of  GNP relative to the 1970s, 
as table 9.12 shows. Thus the decline in the general government budget 
balance was not quite as bad as the decline in the federal budget balance. 
9.6.4  Private Saving 
Table 9.13 reports the total gross national saving rate, including both 
private and government saving, for the twenty-four countries in the 
OECD. The figure for the United States in 1984 was 17.0 percent, and 
the average for the others was 23.1 percent. Even aside from public 
dissaving in the form of government budget deficits, there are disparities 
in private saving between the United States and other countries. The 
U.S. household  saving rate, at 5.1 percent  of  disposable income in 
1985, is extremely low by international standards. The United  King- 
dom’s is 11.9, West Germany’s 13.0, Japan’s 22.5.56  Japan’s especially 
high  rate  of  household  saving has been  attributed  to, among other 
things, a prosaving tax and financial system, a shortage of  housing, 
leisure, and consumption goods on which to spend income, and a de- 
mographic bulge in the generation of Japanese who will be retiring over 
the next twenty years. 
According to some theories, an increase in  the U.S. budget deficit 
such as has occurred in the 1980s should produce an increase in private Table 9.13  Gross Saving as Percentage of  GDP 
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saving to offset  it. The theoretical argument  is that households will 
think ahead to the day when the government has to raise taxes to pay 
off the debt, and that they will increase their saving today so that they 
or  their children will have the resources to pay those taxes. The original 
supply-siders in the administration  relied less on that theoretical ar- 
gument than on the argument that households would respond to a higher 
after-tax  rate of  return by saving more. In any case, the predicted 
increase in the personal saving rate did not materialize. The personal 
saving rate, as a percentage of disposable personal income, fell from 
7.1 percent in  1980 to 5.1 percent in  1985. Corporate saving rose, on 
the other hand, by  1 percent of GNP in  1985 relative  to the 1970s. 
When personal and corporate saving are added together, total private 
saving as a share of GNP in  1985 was approximately  the same as it 
was on average in the 1970s. 
Thus, there was no upsurge in private saving to offset the increase 
in the budget deficit. This means that there was less national saving 
left over to finance investment. 
9.6.5  The Relationship between National Saving and Investment 
In a closed economy, that is, one cut off from the rest of the world, 
the fall in  national  saving would  have driven up the cost of  capital 
however much necessary to reduce the level of investment to the level 
of domestic funds available to finance it.57  As it was, the cost of capital 
did rise in the 1980s, whether measured as the real interest rate or the 
return on equity, as we saw in the previous section. But because the 
increase in interest rates attracted a large capital inflow (“net foreign 
investment,”  in table 9.9), investment in plant and equipment was not 
crowded out as much as it otherwise would have been. The net capital 
inflow is precisely the current account deficit, which has generated so 
much concern, viewed from its more flattering profile. That a decline 
in national saving must either be offset by a net capital inflow or else 
reflected as a decline in investment, is a very general proposition; the 
natural mechanism is the increase in real interest rates, but the prop- 
osition must hold, no matter what happens to financial market prices. 
An interesting question is how changes in national savings have been 
divided between changes in capital flow and changes in investment in 
prior historical episodes. Figure 9.5 shows U.S.  national saving, in- 
vestment, and the current account surplus (capital outflow) over the 
last  three decades, each as shares of  GNP.  The saving rate and in- 
vestment rate move closely together; the difference between the two, 
the current account, moves less. That is, before  the  1980s, foreign 
capital usually played a small role in financing U.S. investment. 
It would  be wrong to conclude from this correlation alone that a 
change in national saving resulting from an exogenous change in fiscal 611  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
policy is necessarily reflected in investment rather than in the current 
account. The close correlation between saving and investment rates in 
figure 9.5 could result from the effect of a third factor on both, rather 
than a causal relationship between the two. The business cycle is the 
most obvious third factor: saving rates and investment rates are both 
known to rise in booms and fall in recessions. 
There are several ways of attempting to address this problem. One 
would be to adjust saving and investment cyclically, or to use more 
sophisticated econometric techniques. A  second is to look at saving 
and investment rates across countries rather than over time. Table 9.14 
gives the investment rates for twenty-four countries to match the na- 
tional saving rates in table 9.13. A country like the United States-or 
Belgium, Denmark, and  Sweden-which  has a low rate of  national 
saving, also tends to have a low rate of  investment; a country like 
Japan-or  Finland, Norway, and Switzerland-which  has high saving 
rates, tends to have high investment rates. 
A third way to get around the problem of cyclical variation in saving 
and investment is to average yearly observations over somewhat longer 
time intervals to take out some of the cyclical effect. Figure 9.6 shows 
decade averages of saving, investment, and the current account from 
the 1870s to the 1970s. The saving and investment rates are still highly 
correlated. The only time when the two diverged as widely as they 
have in the mid-1980s was the 1910s. U.S. investment had fallen slightly 
below national saving, that is, the country had begun to run current 
account surpluses, in the  1890s. But this capital outflow reached its 
highest during World War I, as the United States was lending to finance 
dissaving in Europe. Subsequent divergences between saving and in- 
vestment were much smaller. 
The experience of the 1980s stands out among industrialized coun- 
tries, even if we look only at the absolute magnitude of the net capital 
flow (as opposed to the direction). The United States and other econ- 
omies, which erected barriers to trade and capital flows in the  1930s 
and 1940s, have become more integrated since. The increasing degree 
of integration of financial markets in the 1970s and 1980s allows coun- 
tries to have different saving rates without the differences in investment 
rates having to be as large; international capital flows make up the 
difference. 
9.6.6  The United States as a Net Debtor 
The U.S. current account at present stands out, even more than by 
virtue of its absolute magnitude, because a wealthy country is running 
persistent deficits. Through most of  the twentieth century the United 
States has run current account surpluses, as we have seen. Even in 
the 1970s, when the two oil shocks raised import spending, the current 
account was on average equal to zero. Table 9.14  Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Percentage of GDP 
































































17.9  18.1  18.2 
32.0  33.2  34.4 
23.1  22.4  23.3 
23.8  23.3  23.4 
19.1  19.4  18.9 
19.5  20 3  21.0 
23.2  21.5  21.4 
20.5  20.7  21.1 
26.6  25.7  25.1 
22.9  21.5  21.3 
24.2  23.4  24.6 
25.1  23.1  23.8 
20.3  23.2  24.6 
32.1  32.7  25.7 
20.1  20.9  23.3 
23.9  22.1  22.2 
26.4  26.9  24.6 
29.7  26.9  24.3 
26.6  22.2  22.6 
22.3  22.8  23.2 
































































19.16  18.4  17.0  17.1  18.3  19.5  19.8 
36.4  34.8  32.5  31.2  30.2  30.4  31.7 
23.9  21.6  20.4  20.1  20.2  20.7  21.8 
23.8  24.3  23.3  23.3  22.3  21.4  21.5 
20.0  20.9  19.9  19.4  18.6  18.5  18.8 
20.8  22.4  20.6  20.0  19.6  18.7  18.8 
22.4  23.0  24.0  23.1  22.7  22.2  22.6 
23.0  22.4  21.0  20.8  21.2  21 9  22.3 
28.5  28.4  26.7  26.0  26.7  25 6  25.1 
21.4  22.7  22.5  22.1  21.7  21.7  20.8 
24.8  24.0  21.1  23.0  22.1  21.7  20.9 
28.8  29.8  31.3  27.9  27.0  24.0  23.2 
28.0  22.2  20.8  21.2  23.0  23.9  25.8 
31.6  33.9  33.2  28.7  27.8  24.8  23.7 
25.3  24.6  22.7  25.0  24.8  27.7  30.5 
27.3  24.5  27.8  24.9  25.1  24.1  24.3 
23.1  21.9  21.1  19.4  21.1  21.3  21.0 
29.3  30.5  34.2  36.3  37.1  31.8  27.7 
26.8  26.0  25.9  25.1  26.5  27.9  26.6 
23.6  24.7  23.3  21.8  21.0  19.9  18.9 









































































































18.4 Switzerland  28.7  27.4  26.0  25.6  25.8  27.5  29.2  29.7  29.4  27.6  24.0  20.6  20.7  21.4  21.8  23.8  24.1  23.1  23.3  23.3 
Turkey  14.6  15.9  16.4  17.3  17.4  18.6  17.0  20.2  20.1  18.6  20.8  23.1  24.4  21.9  20.8  19.9  19.3  19.1  18.9  18.5 
Total smaller 
European countries  24.0  24.3  24.1  23.7  23.4  24.1  24.2  24.5  24.7  24.3  23.5  22.9  23.1  22.2  21.6  21.8  21.4  20.6  20.2  19.7 
Australia  27.7  27.3  26.5  26.9  26.7  26.5  26.9  25.2  24.4  23.8  24.2  24.1  23.8  23.8  23.1  23.9  25.6  24.8  22.3  21.8 
New Zealand  21.9  21.9  20.3  18.5  19.6  20.8  20.7  22.5  22.7  25.9  27.0  24.8  22.4  20.8  18.2  18.2  21.2  23.0  22.7  21.5 
Total smallercountries  24.4  24.6  24.3  24.0  23.7  24.3  24.5  24.5  24.6  24.3  23.6  23.1  23.2  22.4  21.7  22.0  21.9  21.2  20.5  20.1 
Total OECD  21.3  21.3  21.0  21.1  21.5  21.7  22.0  22.4  23.2  22.7  21.5  21.2  21.5  22.0  22.2  21.8  21.3  20.1  19.7  19.9 
Four major 
European countries  22.2  22.0  21.6  21.6  21.9  22.7  22.8  22.5  22.6  22.3  21.1  20.9  20.4  20.2  20.6  21.0  20.1  19.4  18.9  18.9 
OECD Europe  22.7  22.7  22.4  22.2  22.3  23.2  23.3  23.1  23.3  23.0  2t.9  21.6  21.3  20.9  21.0  21.3  20.5  19.8  19.3  19.2 
EEC  22.4  22.3  22.0  22.0  22.2  23.0  22.9  22.7  22.8  22.6  21.4  21.0  20.7  20.5  20.7  21.0  20.1  19.4  18.9  18.7 
Total OECD less 
the United States  23.9  24.0  24.0  24.1  24.5  25.3  25.3  25.3  26.0  25.5  24.2  23.8  23.5  23.4  23.5  23.6  23.4  22.4  21.7  21.6 
Source: National Accounts (annual OECD publication); table from OECD Economic Ourlook, May 1986. 
Notes: The data in this table are measured  according to the standard definitions of the OECmUnited Nations  system of accounts (see A  System of 
National Accounts, Series F, no. 2, rev. 3, United Nations,  1968). The percentages for each group of countries are calculated from the total GDP and 
gross fixed capital formation for the group, with both aggregates expressed in U.S. dollars at current exchange rates. 614  Jeffrey A. Frankel/Sabuto Okita/Peter  G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
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Fig. 9.6  U.S. national saving (private saving plus government budget 
surplus) (NS), investment (I), and current account (CA) as 
shares of GNP, 1870- 1979. Sources: Ransom and Sutch 1983, 
tables 4 and El; U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical 
Statistics of the United States. 
As the direct implication of the current account surpluses from the 
1980s to the 1960s, the United States was accumulating net claims on 
foreigners. During World War I the country passed from being a net 
debtor vis-A-vis the rest of the world to being a net creditor. By  1981 
the United States had attained a recorded net investment position of 
$140.7 billion (with 37 percent of the private assets consisting of direct 
investment and 47 percent consisting of  bank-reported claims) (Eco- 
nomic Report of the President 1986, 371). 
Net interest and other income on this investment position earned 
$34.1 billion in  1981, more than enough to pay for the deficit in mer- 
chandise trade  and  leave a surplus in goods and services or in  the 
overall current account. But the current account went into deficit in 
1982, as we  have  seen, as a result  of  the pattern  of  high  U.S. real 
interest rates, capital inflow from abroad, strong dollar, and U.S. trade 
deficit. The situation deteriorated rapidly. By 1985 the current account 
deficit reached $1 17.7 billion. (Despite the depreciation of  the dollar 
that began in March  1985, the current account deficit in 1986 was in 
the neighborhood of  $140 billion.) It took only three years of current 
account deficit to undo a century of accumulation  of foreign assets. 
Sometime in  early  198F  the country on the books returned to net- 
debtor from net-creditor status, as table 9.15 shows. By the end of 
1986 the U.S.  recorded position was approximately  -$225  billion, a 
debt far higher than the creditor position was at its peak. Even if  the 
depreciated dollar leads to an improved trade balance by  1988, as it is 
expected to in  line with the customary  lags, the  United  States will 
probably continue to run substantial trade deficits for quite a few years, 
and the net debt will continue to mount rapidly. 615  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
Even if the 1985-86 depreciation of the dollar soon reduces the trade 
deficit to a plateau of $100 billion, the net debt position would reach 
the vicinity of $600 billion by the end of  1989. Simply multiplying by 
an interest  rate  would  suggest that  the annual cost of  interest  and 
dividends to investors in other countries would then run on the order 
of $40 billion to $50 billion. In other words, to eliminate the overall 
current account deficit in  the  1990s would  then require not just an 
elimination of the remaining $100 billion trade deficit, but a reversal to 
a trade surplus of  $40 billion to $50 billion in order to earn the money 
to service the debt that has been incurred in the meantime. 
Calculation of  the interest and dividend payments is more compli- 
cated than this, however, because different assets pay different rates 
of return and the composition of U.S. overseas assets is different from 
the composition of US.  liabilities. Foreign investments in the United 
States are somewhat more concentrated in Treasury and other bonds 
(19.3 percent of privately held assets) as opposed to direct investment 
(21.3 percent) and bank-reported liabilities (41.3 percent). (Corporate 
stocks are 14.7 percent, and other U.S. liabilities are 3.4 percent.) This 
is as compared to U.S.  investments abroad which are relatively less 
concentrated  in  bonds  (8.9 percent  of  private assets) and relatively 
more in direct investment (28.3 percent) and bank-reported assets (54.4 
percent). (Corporate stocks are 5.0 percent, and other U.S. assets are 
3.4 percent.) Earnings on direct investment and bank loans tend to be 
greater than interest earned on bonds; as a result, recorded earnings 
on U.S. assets abroad still exceed recorded payments on foreign in- 
vestments in the United States, even a year after its return to net debtor 
status. In  1986 (first three quarters), the recorded return on all U.S. 
investments abroad ran at an average 9.7 percent, the payment rate on 
U.S. liabilities at only 6.5 percent.  If  this differential holds  up, the 
recorded balance  on overseas investment income will decline more 
slowly than one would otherwise think. But an unprecedented decline 
will nevertheless take place. Estimates by the Institute of International 
Economics place the likely 1990 investment income balance in the range 
of  -$15  billion to -$25  billion (Islam 1987). 
If the funds borrowed from abroad in the 1980s were being used to 
finance productive investment in plant and equipment, then the addi- 
tional output would be available in future decades to service the debt. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, the funds have been going to finance 
the federal budget deficit (or, equivalently, to offset crowding out of 
private  investment). As many less developed  debtor countries have 
discovered over the last five years, military arms or consumer goods 
do not generate the foreign exchange earnings needed to service the 
debt incurred when they were earlier purchased. 
All of the above figures on the U.S.  net indebtedness position are 
subject to more than the usual amount of measurement error. The two Table 9.15  International Investment Position of the United States at Year 
End, 1984 and 1985 (millions of  dollars) 
Changes in Position in 1985 (decrease 1-1) 
~~  ~ 
Attributable to: 
Other 
Posi-  Capital  Price  Ex-  Changesb  Total 
tion  Flows  Changes  changea  (4  (u  +  b +  Position 
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7,007  174 
8,540  1,212 
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-  6c  - 
755  - 
1.314  - 
2,331  - 
-42  - 
-7  2 
1  2 
-8  - 
-  35  -2 
4,182  1,218 
-  92 I 
4,182  - 
1,648  - 
2,534  - 










-  34 























Source: Survey of  Current Business, June 1986. 
Notes: r  = revised; p  = preliminary. 
*Less than $500,000 (+  or -). 
aRepresents gains or losses on foreign currency-denominated assets due to their reval- 
uation at current exchange rates. 
blncludes changes in coverage, statistical discrepancies, and other adjustments to the 
value of  assets. 
=Reflects U.S. Treasury sales of  gold medallions and comemorative and bullion coins; 
these demonetizations are not included in international transactions capital flows. Position by Area  Position by Area 
Other 
Countries, 
Latin American  International 
Republics and  Organizations 
Other Western  and 
Western Europe  Canada  Japan  Hemisphere  Unallocated 
1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985 
-  150,522 
272,148 






































































































































































dAlso includes paid-in  capital subscriptions to international financial  institutions and 
outstanding amounts of miscellaneous claims that have been settled through international 
agreements to be payable to the U.S. government over periods in excess of  one year. 
Excludes World War I debts that are not being serviced. 
eIncludes indebtedness that the borrower may contractually, or at its option, repay with 
its currency, with a third country's currency, or by delivery of  materials or transfer of 
services. 
fIncludes, as part of international and unallocated, the estimated direct investment in 
international shipping companies, in operating oil and gas drilling equipment that is moved 
from country to country during the year, and in petroleum trading companies. Table 9.W  (continued) 
Changes in Position in  1985 (decrease [-I) 
Attributable to: 
Other 
Posi-  Capital  Price  Ex-  Changesb  Total 
tion  Flows  Changes  changea  (4  (a  + b +  Position 
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36,326  1,533 
4,507  - 
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1,072  - 
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31,819  1,533 
-  - 
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35 3  344 
gDetails not shown separately are included in totals in lines 21 and 28. 
hDetails not shown separately are included in line 20. Position by Area  Position by Area 
Latin  Other 
American  Countries, 
Republics  lnternational 
and Other  Organizations 
Western  and 
Western Europe  Canada  Japan  Hemisphere  Unallocated 
1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985  1984  1985 
9,479  9,796  5,158  4,429  1,544  1,491  10,237  9,457  3,578  3,047 
124.608  131,261  21,647  20,381  32,910  35,593  212,875  208,406  53,591 
422,670  515,032  58,485  65,744  101,819  188,729  188,729  212,054  156,280 
72,322  77,862  1,686  1,473  h  9,359  11,781 
8  8  8  8  h  h  B  8  h 
8  8  I  8  h  h  8  8  h 
8  8  8  8  h  h  8  8  h 
2,684  3.098  157  156  1,564  1,361  908  766  9,487 
8  8  8  8  h  h  8  8  h 
8  8  8  8  h  h  8  8  h 
350,348  437,170  56,809  64,271  h  179,370  200,273 
108,211  120,906  15,286  16,678  16,044  19,116  16,201  17,050  8,841 
8  8  8  8  h  h  B  8  h 
89,519  150,117  19,718  25,317  4,193  10,542  8,107  12,314  7,023 
25,585  67,453  1,290  1,579  2.910  8,628  1,236  1,826  1,703 
63,934  82,664  18,428  23,738  1,283  1,914  6,871  10,488  5,320 















8  8  I  D  h  h  8  8  h  h 
‘Primarily included U.S.  government liabilities associated with military sales contracts 
and other transactions arranged with or through foreign official agencies. 620  Jeffrey A. FrankellSaburo Okita/Peter G. Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
major sources of  error go in  opposite directions. On the one hand, if 
most of  the statistical discrepancy in the balance of payments, which 
has run at roughly $25 billion a year from 1979 to 1986, is unreported 
capital inflows, then the true net indebtedness is worse by some $200 
billion.5’ On the other hand, some of the foreign assets acquired in the 
past, particularly direct investment, have undergone increases in value 
that are not reflected in the figures, suggesting that the true position 
may be better than recorded. It seems likely that the first effect is at 
least as important as the second. The Federal Reserve Board estimates 
that the country may  have become a net debtor in  1983 rather than 
1985, with net indebtedness reaching $235 billion in 1985.60  In any case, 
the sheer magnitude of the current account deficits guarantees that the 
net indebtedness position is deteriorating very rapidly. 
9.7  Conclusion 
Massive U.S. borrowing from the rest of  the world in the  1980s is 
the result of massive borrowing by the U.S. government. By 1980, the 
U.S.  government had  accumulated a debt  of  $914  billion  over two 
centuries. This debt precisely doubled by 1985 and is estimated to have 
reached  $2,130 billion by the end of  1986 (Economic Indicators, Oc- 
tober 1986). The role of foreigners in financing the U.S. budget deficit 
is dramatized by the fact that foreign ownership of Treasury securities 
is rising rapidly; recorded private holdings stood at $84 billion as of 
the  end  of  1985, and  official holdings at $136 billion.  But  from  an 
economic  viewpoint,  it  is  immaterial whether foreign residents  buy 
U.S. government debt  directly  or whether  they  lend  the  money  to 
private U.S. residents who use it to buy government debt. 
The big increase in government borrowing after 1980 was not on the 
whole accommodated by monetary policy. While the total federal debt 
doubled, the debt held by the Federal Reserve went up by somewhat 
less and consequently the debt held by the public went up somewhat 
more. The borrowing drove up real interest rates in the United States, 
attracting capital inflows from all parts of the world and in all forms. 
This capital inflow has been made easier by reduced taxes and controls 
on international capital movements and a general trend of liberalization 
and innovation. The favorable aspect of the inflow is that by helping 
to finance the federal deficit it has kept U.S. real interest rates lower 
than they would otherwise be. The unfavorable aspect is that the coun- 
terpart to the record capital account surpluses is the record trade and 
current account deficits.61 
The widespread feeling is that these imbalances are unsustainable. 
The U.S. trade deficit may be politically unsustainable, in  the sense 
that congressmen will be pushed, by those of their constitutents that 621  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
suffer from the international competition, into enacting protectionist 
barriers. This would be very costly for both the country as a whole 
and the world trading system as a whole. 
It is also possible that the borrowing from abroad is unsustainable 
in the sense that at some point foreigners will tire of accepting ever- 
larger quantities of U.S. assets into their portfolios. The consequence 
then could be a sharp fall in the value of the dollar combined with a 
sharp increase in U.S. interest rates. For the dollar by itself to accom- 
plish enough trade improvement to return the country to current ac- 
count equilibrium, the depreciation would have to be considerably larger 
than what we have already seen in  1985 and 1986. 
The unpleasant alternative is that the same improvement in the trade 
balance would at some point instead be accomplished by a recession, 
reducing imports. The large stock of debt already outstanding means 
that U.S. policy-making will from now on find itself much more re- 
stricted in its ability to respond to adverse developments. Because the 
federal deficit is already large despite four years of economic expansion, 
the government will not be able to respond to any future recession by 
reducing taxes or raising expenditure. Still less will the Federal Reserve 
be  able to respond to a recession by  lowering interest  rates,  if  the 
source of  the  recession is a reduction in the willingness of foreign 
investors to keep supplying the United States with capital. Indeed, the 
outstanding debt to foreigners means that a likely scenario is the one 
in  which investors’ fears that the United  States will  have difficulty 
maintaining the future value of those assets will cause the depreciation 
of the dollar to accelerate and interest rates to rise. In such a scenario 
the Federal  Reserve would be  reluctant to expand monetary policy 
because that might further enhance fears of inflation and dollar depre- 
ciation. At that point there might be no alternative to a combination 
of sharply higher interest rates and recession in order to reduce imports 
and restore the confidence of financial markets. This position, a familiar 
one to many debtors, would be a new one for Americans. 
As of the beginning of 1987, the financial markets are still absorbing 
the imbalances with little difficulty. The decline of the dollar has been 
a “soft landing” rather than a “hard landing” in the sense that interest 
rates have come down since 1984 rather than gone up. This is  probably 
because the dollar depreciation has been the result af a combination 
of (1) easier monetary policy, (2) perceptions of reduced future budget 
deficits under the Gramm-Rudman legislation, and (3) a confidence- 
inspiring process of  consultation and coordination between U.S. and 
other authorities, most dramatically represented by the September 1985 
Plaza Accord. The federal budget deficit will decline somewhat in 1987, 
and probably the trade deficit soon thereafter. But the policies now in 
place imply continued massive federal deficits, and as a result continued 
capital inflows and trade deficits, into the indefinite future. 622  Jeffrey A. Frankel/Saburo Okita/Peter G.  PetersodJames R. Schlesinger 
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1. In table 9.1, the private capital outflow is measured as increases in U.S. 
“private assets abroad”  (which appear with negative signs because they are 
accounting debits) less increases in other foreign assets in the United States 
(which appear with positive signs because they are accounting credits). 
2. Under the floating exchange rate system, an investor’s increase in demand 
for dollar assets can take the form of an increase in the exchange value of the 
dollar and does not need to show up as an actual inflow of capital. 
3. This figure is arrived at by  assuming that the statistical discrepancy rep- 
resents primarily unreported capital flows. 
4. If  the statistical discrepancy is interpreted as unrecorded private capital 
inflows, then the true private capital account was approximately in balance in 
1979-80  (a surplus in 1979 for the first time in decades, and a deficit in 1980). 
The recorded  private capital account continued to show a deficit in  1979 and 
for several years thereafter. 
5. See Levich  1985 for a survey of  empirical evidence on efficiency in in- 
ternational financial markets. 
6. See Levich in this volume, chap. 4, for elaboration on such innovations. 
7. Press release, August 20, 1986. The figures have been adjusted to elimi- 
nated double counting of transactions between institutions. 
8. Press release, Bank of  England, August 20, 1986. Tokyo was counted as 
$48 billion, other Pacific centers have been estimated at $30 billion, and Zurich 
and Frankfurt together have been estimated as big as New York. 
9. The calculation is the average of the bid-ask spread as a percentage  of 
the rate, quoted at 3:OO  P.M. daily by  Barclay’s Bank in London. A Bank of 
Canada study shows the pound ahead of the mark and yen in bid-ask spreads 
for 1973-81  (Longworth, Boothe and Clinton  1983, 63). 
10. In the London foreign exchange market, the ranking by volume is pound, 
mark, yen, Swiss franc, French franc, lira, and Canadian dollar. (The sources 
on 1986 trading volume are the press releases cited above.) 
11. Frankel  1984 reports figures on how much of Japanese trade is invoiced 
in  yen. Table 9.11 in this chapter gives the figures for shares of dollars, yen, 
and other currencies in the foreign exchange reserve holdings of central banks. 
12. For a description of Germany’s controls, see Dooley and Isard  1980. 
13. January  1975-April  1979. The variance of  the differential was 3.29. The 
source is Frankel 1984, 23. 
14. The mean differential was 0.26 and the variance 0.22 for the period May 
1979 to November  1983 (Frankel 1984). 
15. Also, the rate of increase in long-term liabilities abroad fell from $14.759 
billion to $7.124 billion. The source is the Bank of Japan, Balance of  Payments 
Monthly, as reported in the OECD Economic Survey on Japan, August  1985, 
p. 21. 
16. Eurodollar rate, covered, relative to yen gensaki (It0 1986, 240). 
17. Morgan Guaranty,  World Financial Markets, September 1986. 
18. When there is a large and variable differential  (even with the offshore 
interest rate measured in domestic currency) it means that barriers must exist, 
in the form of  either  capital controls or the sort of  political  risk discussed 623  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
below.  Although  there is no surefire way  of  telling which  sort of  barrier  is 
operating just by looking at the interest rates, there is a useful rule of  thumb. 
When a country is seen to experience an increase in perceived riskiness, due 
to high budget or balance of payments deficits or political  instability,  if  the 
offshore rate rises  relative  to the onshore rate it  signifies that controls are 
preventing the free outflow of capital; if the onshore rate rises relative to the 
offshore rate, it  signifies that political  risk  is scaring off  investors and so a 
higher return is needed to clear the market. 
19.  U.S.  corporations issue bearer bonds in the Euromarket. In October 
1984, the U.S. government  began  to do the same, in the form of  “specially 
targeted Treasury notes.”  The premium that investors were willing to pay to 
hold these securities, relative to regular registered Treasury notes, fluctuated 
from around forty basis points to zero, apparently as foreign perceptions fluc- 
tuated as to how onerous was a requirement that bond dealers certify that the 
beneficial owners are not US.  citizens or residents (Merrill Lynch 1985, 14). 
20. However, IBFs remain subject to several important restrictions that do 
not apply to Eurobanking (Chrystal  1984, 6). 
21. One (intended) result of  the abolition of the U.S. withholding tax was 
the demise of large-scale Eurobond issues by U.S. corporations through sub- 
sidiaries in the Netherlands Antilles to avoid the tax. This corporate borrowing, 
which previously showed up in the balance of payments accounts as reductions 
in U.S. direct investment claims on foreigners, now takes its true form-foreign 
purchases of U.S. securities. 
22. Interestingly, U.S. Treasury securities issued in the Euromarket often 
must pay a higher yield than Eurobonds issued by top-rated U.S. corporations, 
suggesting some perceived default risk (Gonzales 1985, table 14). 
23. Golub  (1986, 8a) estimates that net borrowing  in  dollars  by  eighteen 
OECD governments alone rose from $2.619 billion in 1972 to a peak of $25.852 
billion in  1982. Dollar borrowing by developing countries was much greater, 
at least until recent years. 
24. The recorded capital inflow (change in foreign assets in the United States 
less U.S. assets abroad, not counting official reserve assets) did not turn pos- 
itive until  1983 and climbed to $99.852 billion in  1985. Most of  the statistical 
discrepancy is thought to be unrecorded capital inflows, hence the higher capital 
inflow numbers in the text. But some fraction of the discrepancy is probably 
unreported service exports, particularly interest earnings, so the capital inflow 
numbers in the text may be a little overstated. 
25. The subsequent discussion draws on hard and Stekler 1985. 
26. The borrowing via Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries was reversed, fol- 
lowing the abolition in  1984 of  the U.S. withholding tax; in  1985, U.S.  cor- 
porations began retiring the past debt issued through the subsidiaries. 
27. The source is the Survey of  Current Business, e.g., table  1, p. 35, and 
table 8, p. 50, in the March 1985 issue. Isard and Stekler (1985, 222-23)  admit 
that decisions on how to adjust the data are necessarily somewhat arbitrary. 
28. The U.S. figures are from Survey of  Current Business, June 1986, table 10, 
p. 65. The Japanese figures are from the Japan Center for International Finance. 
29. Survey of  Current Business, June 1986, table 3, p. 31. 
30.  For  more  on  foreign  direct  investment, see  Lipsey  in  this  volume, 
31. Federal Reserve Bulletin, May  1985, p. 279. 
32. Ibid., and Federal Reserve Bulletin, May  1986, p. 295. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Federal Reserve Bulletin, table 3.15, August 1982 and June 1986. More 
than 100 percent of this decline in dollar holdings occurred in  1981. Liabilities 
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to foreign official institutions actually rose from then until 1985. However this 
rise in dollar holdings can be completely accounted for by interest earnings. 
35. IMFAnnual Report,  1986, table 1.3, p. 61. 
36. Central banks make the decision to trade their own currencies for foreign 
reserve currencies on the basis  of  macroeconomic considerations. But  the 
decision how to allocate a given portfolio of foreign currency reserves is in- 
fluenced by expected returns on the various currencies. Admittedly  the dis- 
tinction  can be  blurred  because  some countries habitually  do their foreign 
exchange intervention  in  dollars, perhaps for the sake of convenience. The 
argument that central bank portfolio behavior is destabilizing is due to Bergsten 
and Williamson, forthcoming. 
37. The argument that official reserve transactions should be classified to- 
gether with the private  capital  account validates  the decision  made by  the 
Department of Commerce ten years ago to cease reporting the “official  set- 
tlements balance”  in the balance of payments statistics, to force readers to 
look at the trade or current account balances in its place. See Stern 1977. Table 
9.9 here compromises, by reporting some net balances within the capital ac- 
count, both private and official. 
38. Kidwell,  Marr, and Trimble (1986) document this differential in more 
detail. But it is possible that the apparent differential is simply due to different 
composition  of  the corporations issuing the bonds in the two markets. Ma- 
harajan  and Fraser (1986), by examining ninety-two pairs  of bond  offerings 
that  are closely matched  with  respect to corporate parent, rating,  maturity, 
and other characteristics between 1975 and 1983, test the widespread percep- 
tion that U.S. corporations can borrow more cheaply in the Euromarket than 
at home. They find, to the contrary, no differential. 
39. For the periods 1980-81  and 1983-84,  increases in  the interest differ- 
entials do not support the safe haven explanation  of the dollar appreciation. 
Similarly, the period when the differentials resumed their decline, 1985-86,  is 
the period when the dollar was finally depreciating, not continuing to appreciate 
as one would expect under the safe haven hypothesis. Even in 1982, the one 
year in  which  movement in the long-term  interest differential  supports the 
hypothesis, the evidence from short-term differentials goes the other way, as 
we saw in section 9.3. 
40. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan. The 
interest rates are yields on government bonds, in their own currencies, with 
maturities  ranging from ten years or more for Japan and Canada to twenty 
years for the United States and Canada. The weights are moving averages of 
GNP shares. The source is the International Monetary Fund. 
41. Morgan Guaranty’s index. The weights are based on 1980 U.S. bilateral 
trade in manufactures, and the price levels are wholesale prices of nonfood 
manufactures. 
42. The three statistics are simple averages  of  dollar depreciation against 
other currencies: the mark, yen, pound, French franc, and Swiss franc in the ’ 
case of the American Express and Economist surveys, and the first four cur- 
rencies in the case of the Money Market Services survey. For further descrip- 
tion and analysis of the survey data, see Frankel and Froot 1986. 
43. If arbitrage equates the nominal interest differential to investors’ expected 
nominal depreciation, then the real interest differential will equal expected real 
depreciation. 
44. The peak real interest differential by this measure was 4.2 percent. The 
expected inflation rates in the figure are calculated by the International Mon- 
etary Fund from distributed lags on actual inflation rates. 625  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
45. The interest rates are on ten-year bonds from Morgan Guaranty.  The 
trading partners are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, weighted 
by GNP shares. Following the logic of note 43, one might infer from a 1984 
ten-year real interest differential of 3 percent that investors must have expected 
the dollar to depreciate in real terms over the next ten years at an average rate 
of 3 percent a year, or approximately  30 percent cumulatively. If ten years is 
thought to be a long enough time to guarantee a return to long-run equilibrium, 
this rough calculation suggests that in  1984 the market considered the dollar 
to be  about  30  percent  above its equilibrium.  (Note that  investors do not 
respond directly  to real interest differentials,  but rather to nominal interest 
differentials and expected exchange rate changes; Frankel 1986.) 
46. Now owned by Morgan Stanley. 
47. The average of the four end-of-quarter figures (Frankel 1986, table 2-1). 
48. Such bandwagon expectations are supported by survey data at horizons 
of one week to one month, shorter-term than the survey data shown in figure 
9.3c. 
49. Economic Indicators, September 1986. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, September 12, 1986, reports 9.9 percent at a compounded annual rate 
of change. 
50. The identity is that investment is equal to national  saving plus the net 
capital inflow from abroad. 
51. In this framework, how would we interpret an increase in real interest 
rates caused by a monetary contraction as in 1980-82?  One could think of it 
as a fall in the private saving rate associated with the recession. 
52. Reductions in personal income taxes were more important to the supply- 
siders in the Reagan camp than the corporate investment tax incentives. 
53. Investment net of depreciation shows more of a decline after 1980 than 
gross investment because the capital consumption allowance is higher in the 
1980s than in the 1970s. 
54. Bosworth 1985. Feldstein (1986) finds no evidence of an effect of changes 
in corporate tax rates and investment incentives on interest rates. He estimates 
that the increase in projected  budget deficits was responsible for about two- 
thirds of the rise in interest rates between 1977-78  and 1983-84. 
55. An upward  shift in firms’ desire to invest could lead to an increase in 
real interest rates, without an increase in the quantity of investment actually 
undertaken, if the sources of saving available to finance investment were com- 
pletely unresponsive to interest rates. But even if  domestic U.S. saving, both 
private and public, is indeed unresponsive to interest rates, the available supply 
offoreign saving is to the contrary highly responsive to the U.S. interest rate. 
Thus the failure of the observed investment rate to rise in the 1980s is valid 
evidence against the claim that enhanced investment incentives can alone ex- 
plain the increase in the U.S. interest rate and the capital inflow. 
56. U.S. Department of Commerce, British Central Statistical Office, West 
German Bundesbank, and Japanese Economic Planning Agency. 
57. Changes in private or public saving also tend to affect the level of income, 
when the economy is operating at less than full employment. To focus on the 
relationship among saving, investment, and overseas borrowing as percentages 
of aggregate income, it helps to think of monetary policy in the background, 
holding income constant. It is, in fact, not unrealistic to think of the Federal 
Reserve as having targeted nominal GNP in recent years. 
58. The 1982-84  figures were revised in 1985 to incorporate the results of a 
1982 benchmark survey of  U.S.  direct investment abroad. On the revised 
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59. The uncertainties are particularly  large vis-a-vis Latin America. Much 
capital flight to the United States is unreported. Furthermore, one might not 
wish to count the loans of U.S. banks to troubled debtors at full value as they 
now appear on the books. A 50 percent write-down, for example, would wipe 
out over $100 billion of claims on Latin America alone. 
60. Federal Reserve Bulletin, May  1986, p. 294.  A separate point is that a 
precise definition of the term net debtor would include only loans and bonds, 
excluding corporate stock and direct investment. See Van der Ven  and Wilson 
1986, 11. However, investment income has to be paid to foreign residents not 
just in the form of  interest on the debt, but equally in the form of  dividends 
and repatriated earnings on the rest. 
61. From the viewpoint of other countries, the favorable aspect of the capital 
flow is their trade surpluses  vis-a-vis the United  States, and the unfavorable 
aspect is that their real interest rates are higher than they would otherwise be. 
Both points are particularly relevant for troubled debtors who must compete 
with the United States for funds. 
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2. Saburo Okita 
Domestic Economic Policy and International 
Capital Flows 
In the twenty years from 1961 through 1980, Japan’s international bal- 
ance of payments current account was in the red about as many years 
as it was in the black-eight years in the red and twelve in the black. 
Our trade statistics were in the red for eleven yers and in the black for 
nine. Yet  since the early 1970s, the tendency has been for the current 
account balance  to run consistently in the black, as pointed  out by 
Hendrik Houthakker,  then a member  of  the  President’s Council of 628  Jeffrev A. FrankelISaburo Okita/Peter G.  Peterson/James R. Schlesinger 
Economic Advisers, Nevertheless, the oil crises of  1973 and 1979 sharply 
increased Japan’s oil import bill and broke the string of consecutive 
surplus years. Since then, the Japanese economy has recovered from 
the oil crises and, with the help of  the recent slippage in  oil prices, 
recorded annually increasing  surpluses in  its  current account.  Still, 
surpluses are a very  new  situation for Japan, and one that we  are 
unaccustomed to dealing with. 
In 1981, Japan’s current account surplus was $4.8  billion. In 1985, 
this had risen tenfold to $49.2 billion, and in 1986 it was $86.0 billion. 
United States economic policy must be cited as one of  the causes of 
this surplus. Whereas the United States achieved a real economic growth 
rate of 6.5 percent in 1984 through running massive fiscal deficits and 
spurring domestic consumption, the combination  of  this  stimulative 
policy and a policy of maintaining the dollar’s exchange strength meant 
that the United States drew increasing imports from Japan and the rest 
of the world. 
On the other side of the Pacific, the Japanese savings rate has been 
high for a long time, approximately 20 percent of personal disposable 
income going to savings for many years now. In the period of  rapid 
growth from 1960 through the early 1970s, this high Japanese savings 
rate was absorbed by an equally high rate of investment, and the bal- 
ance between savings and investment was maintained. Yet in the early 
1970s, notably in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, the Japanese economic 
growth rate fell from 10 percent to only 5 percent on average for the 
1970s and 3 percent to 4 percent in recent years, while the savings rate 
showed little if any decline, with the result that Japan has run chronic 
savings surpluses. 
Going into the  1980s, this  savings surplus contributed to a sharp 
increase in the outflow of  capital from Japan, and Japan has been the 
world’s largest capital-exporting nation since 1985. According to Bank 
of International Settlements statistics, the total overseas assets of Jap- 
anese banks were $1,019.4 billion as of the end of  September  1986, 
easily outpacing  the United States, the United  Kingdom, and West 
Germany to account for 31.5 percent  of  the balance outstanding in 
international financial markets. 
Anticipating this, The Economist published an article titled “A  New 
Japan”  on October  13, 1983, saying that “the third western muddle 
over Japan’s current-account  surplus is mirrored  in  a deficit on the 
capital account, which means that more Japanese  savings are being 
invested abroad than foreigners are investing in Japan. Excellent. The 
second biggest capitalist economy ought to be a capital exporter. Since 
countries first learned how to help each other grow, the rich have been 
lending to the poor.  Nineteenth-century  Britain  ran  a  huge current 
surplus every year, had nil inflation (indeed, a 10 percent fall in retail 629  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
prices over the period 1860-1913), and thus invested at cheap interest 
rates in backward places like California and Canada.” 
The United  States was also an important capital-exporting nation 
from the end of  World  War  I1 until recently.  Such programs as the 
postwar Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Plan) and capital ex- 
ports to countries throughout the world were a major pillar of support 
for global economic development after the war. Although Japan’s cur- 
rent account surplus is expected to decline with the yen’s appreciation 
since early  1985, the  high  Japanese  savings rate  and the decline in 
domestic investment opportunities suggest that Japan will continue to 
be a major capital exporting nation for some time to come. 
Japanese domestic economic policy since the war has been one of 
promoting recovery and economic growth. In 1960, a plan for doubling 
national income was drafted, with myself directly responsible as head 
of the Planning Bureau in the Economic Planning Agency. We  proposed 
five main tenets underlying this plan. As MIT’s Lester Thurow wrote 
on this plan in 1982 in the proceedings of  a symposium, The Manage- 
ment Challenge: Japan’s Views, convened to assess Japan’s postwar 
economic performance,  “Consider the five elements in the Japanese 
economic strategy at the beginning of  the income-doubling decade: 
strengthen social overhead capital, push growth industries, promote 
exports, develop human ability and technology, and secure social sta- 
bility by mitigating the dual structure of  the economy. This list could 
easily serve as strategic objectives for the American economy by the 
year 2000.” 
On the fourth objective, that of developing our human resources and 
promoting science and technology, the Ministry of Education initiated 
a project to sharply expand technological education in Japan in line 
with this income-doubling plan. In the past, plans for upgrading the 
industrial structure had focused on promoting heavy industry. In steel, 
for example, crude steel production went from 22 million tons in 1960 
to 118 million tons in 1973. Yet with the oil crisis, there was a shift to 
energy conservation, and the Japanese industrial structure shifted from 
one centered on heavy industry to one centered on science and tech- 
nology, with particular  emphasis on electronics and other precision 
industries. In Japan, this is termed the shift from ju-ko-cho-dai (heavy, 
thick, long, and big) to kei-haku-tan-sho (light, thin, short, and small). 
Looking again at steel production, output was down to 98 million tons 
in 1986 and is still declining with the yen’s appreciation. 
Fiscal policy has also undergone a change. Until the early  1970s, 
policy was to keep the budget balanced. Yet  with the 1973 oil crisis, 
the Japanese economy recorded its first negative growth since the war. 
Prime Minister Fukuda’s administration responded by issuing deficit- 
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deficit grew steadily, reaching one-third of general budget expenditures 
in  1977. Alarmed at this trend, the Japanese government turned  to 
budget austerity, and the belt-tightening efforts have brought the gen- 
eral budget’s dependency on deficit financing down to 21.4 percent in 
1986. While the fiscal policy of deficit spending did serve to alleviate 
the domestic economic impact of  the oil crises, it also burdened the 
nation with massive debt service payments. As of the end of March 
1986, the ratio of national bonds outstanding to GNP was 41.9 percent, 
and national debt service has topped 20  percent  of  general account 
expenditures for 1986. 
On monetary policy, the emphasis has been on holding interest rates 
down, in part because of the potential exchange rate impact of capital 
flow responding to interest rate differentials, with the result that the 
official discount rate has been lowered several times in recent years. 
The latest cut, on February 23, 1987, has brought it down to a record 
low 2.5 percent. 
Looking at recent trade trends, Japan recorded a $86.0 billion current 
account surplus and a $92.7 billion trade surplus, and had a net long- 
term capital outflow of  $131.8 billion in  1986, despite the yen’s rapid 
appreciation against the dollar. Most of  these increases were due to 
the fall in oil prices and the J-curve effect as the yen appreciated. While 
dollar-denominated  exports were up  19.1 percent  over the previous 
year,  yen-denominated  exports were down  15.9 percent  and export 
volume was down 1.2 percent. There has not only been a drop in the 
value of exports with all of the deflationary consequences that entails; 
there has even been a decline in export volume. On the import side, 
imports were down 2.3 percent in dollar-denominated terms and down 
30.6 percent in yen-denominated terms but up 12.5 percent in volume 
terms. These figures are largely explained by the fact that the collapse 
in oil prices has resulted in a savings of over $30 billion in Japan’s oil 
import bill. 
According to U.S.  statistics, the United States’ trade deficit with 
Japan went from $49.7 billion in 1985 to $58.6 billion in 1986. Yet during 
the same period, the United States’ global trade deficit went from $148.5 
billion in 1985 to $169.8 billion in 1986, the deficit with Japan continuing 
to account for approximately  one-third  of the total.  In  the bilateral 
trade between Japan and the United States, even as total U.S. exports 
were declining from $233.7 billion in  1981 to $217.3 billion in  1986, 
exports to Japan rose from $21.8 billion in 1981 to $26.9 billion in 1986. 
Likewise, the ratio of manufactures to Japan’s total imports from the 
United States also rose, from 45.3 percent in  1981 to 60.7 percent in 
1986. During the same period, manufactures’ share of  total Japanese 
imports rose from 24.3 percent in 1981 to 41.7 percent in 1986. It would 
thus appear that there is a very good chance that the impact of currency 631  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
exchange rate adjustments will result in shrinking both Japan’s surplus 
in its trade with the United States and its overall current account surplus 
in  1987 and beyond. Government estimates predict an $1 1 billion smaller 
current account surplus in fiscal 1987. 
The Maekawa report (formerly the Report of the Advisory Group 
on Economic Structural Adjustment for International Harmony) of  April 
1986 argued that Japan needs to restructure its economy from growth 
dependent on external demand to growth dependent on domestic de- 
mand. Already the estimate for fiscal 1986 (the year ending March 3 1, 
1987) is for real economic growth of  3.0 percent, of  which domestic 
demand is expected to contribute 4.2 percent and net exports minus 
1.3 percent.  In the forecast for fiscal 1987 too, the prospects are for 
3.5 percent real growth, with domestic demand contributing 4.0 percent 
and exports minus 0.5 percent. The Japanese economy is clearly shift- 
ing to growth powered by domestic demand rather than by exports. 
Among the factors contributing to this shift are the fact that fiscal policy 
has made an effort to expand public works, including those by local 
governments and those under the government’s fiscal investment and 
loan program, and the fact that lower interest rates have stimulated 
housing investment and capital investment in the nonmanufacturing 
sector. 
Even with all the best efforts that can be made to promote imports 
and to spur domestic demand, however, Japan will continue to record 
substantial current account  surpluses for some years to come. And 
while currency exchange rate adjustments are important, there is a 
limit, economically and politically, to what they can achieve. According 
to the Nihon Keizai Shinbun’s world economic model, Japan’s net 
overseas assets will top $1  trillion by  1997, while the United States’ 
accumulated debt will also approach the $1  trillion mark. As David 
Hale summarized in the December 5, 1986, Times of  London, “The 
U.S. is a debtor nation with the habits of a creditor nation: Germany 
and Japan are creditor nations with the habits of debtor nations.” 
The questions for the future of the Japan-United  States relationship 
are therefore what political and economic impact these economic im- 
balances and outdated perceptions will have on the relationship and 
whether or not  there  might  be  some poliical means of  braking  the 
imbalance before it gets out of hand. One question here is whether the 
U.S.  effort to turn its trade deficit into a surplus as described by Martin 
Feldstein should depend solely on exchange rate adjustments or whether 
more direct quantitative controls over imports, such as voluntary ex- 
port restraints or import quotas, for example, should be used alongside 
these exchange rate adjustments. 
As seen, there is a very strong likelihood that Japan will continue 
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source of  development capital, is now a major debtor nation, a black 
hole draining savings from Japan, Europe, and the rest of the world. 
If we leave the flow of capital to laissez-faire market mechanisms, the 
bulk  of the capital will be drawn  to the United  States in  search of 
investment security and high interest rates. Conscious policy measures, 
including risk insurance and interest subsidies to offset the low-interest 
and long-term nature of the return, are needed if we are to divert at 
least some of this capital flow to the developing countries. Responding 
to this need, the World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(WIDER), established  in  Helsinki under the auspices of the United 
Nations University, released a report in April 1986 titled “The Potential 
of the Japanese Surplus for World Economic Development” and drawn 
up by WIDER director La1 Jayawardena, WIDER adviser on inter- 
national economic issues and IMF executive director Arjun Sengupta, 
and myself as  chairman of the WIDER governing board. Subsequently, 
I sought to give these ideas wider currency with a July 2 contribution 
to the Nihon Keizai Shinbun titled “Using Its Surpluses to Advantage: 
A Proposal for Enhancing Japanese and World Security.” The thrust 
of this proposal is that “given (i) the imperative that Japan find ways 
to utilize its high savings rate and massive trade surplus effectively for 
Japanese and  world  economic development and (ii) the fact that  a 
serious effort by the United States to reduce its fiscal and trade deficits 
would  have a deflationary impact on the world economy, the author 
proposes that Japan use its surplus one third each for stimulating do- 
mestic demand, providing development capital for the developing coun- 
tries, and supplying capital to the United States and the other indus- 
trialized countries.” 
In November,  as follow-up to this  first WIDER report, a  second 
report was released simultaneously in Tokyo and London titled “Japan 
Urged to Lead in Tackling International Economic Problems.” 
Among the main problems facing the world economy today are the 
major current account surpluses in Japan and West Germany, the twin 
fiscal and trade deficits in the United States, the developing countries’ 
external indebtedness, and stagnating commodity prices. Although there 
are a number of issues outstanding among and between the United 
States, Europe, and Japan, these should be solved not only with bi- 
lateral negotiations but with active policies to  revitalize the world econ- 
omy, including the developing countries. These issues are all interre- 
lated. For example, one of the causes of the United States’ trade deficit 
is that the Latin American countries, long a major market for the United 
States, have had to cut back on imports because of their burgeoning 
debts. Most of the countries of Asia, with a few notable exceptions 
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going in the face of  slow growth in the industrial countries, protec- 
tionism, and lackluster commodity prices. 
It is to be hoped that these problems will be solved with the emphasis 
on growth. In so doing, it may be necessary for Japan to formulate its 
own “Marshall Plan” for the developing countries. One problem here 
is that the surpluses are entirely in the hands of the private sector. The 
government of Japan is moving to recycle its current account surplus 
to the developing countries with subscriptions to the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, and the IDA, but these efforts 
should be stepped up. Although the present state of Japanese govern- 
ment finances does not leave much leeway for increased expenditures 
on top of its plan to double official development assistance (ODA) in 
the seven years 1987 through 1993, there is growing support in Japan 
for having the government provide incentives to encourage the outflow 
of  private sector capital to the developing countries. 
There must be a global approach to these issues, and it must include 
effective utilization of our financial resources and the full mobilization 
of  our intellectual  resources. One first step might be for the World 
Bank, for example, to take the initiative in appointing a World Com- 
mission for the Revitalization of  the World Economy to write a pre- 
scription  for world growth.  Another  possibility  is  for the group of 
economists to look into the  impact on the global economy of  U.S. 
adjustments for turning the trade deficit into a surplus as prescribed 
by Feldstein and to make the necessary policy recommendations. The 
urgency of the issue allows no delay. It is imperative that we act today 
to fend off a tomorrow of  bilateral protectionism, spreading recession, 
and impoverishment for all. 
3. Peter G. Peterson 
Deficit, Debt, and Demographics: Some 
International Aspects 
Let me go back to August  15, 1971, when a bunch of  us were out at 
Camp David closing the gold window, among other things. The view 
of exchange rates at that time as I look back on it was a bit simplistic, 
in terms of what has happened since. We  had the view that, if we could 
just have flexible exchange rates, that somehow the balance of pay- 
ments, by which I think we really meant the balance of trade, because 
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ten to  fifteen years later, we are confronted with the largest trade deficit 
in the history of  the United States, the largest current balance of pay- 
ments deficits in  the history  of the United  States, and the strongest 
dollar in the history of the United States, all of these events happening 
simultaneously. I  can tell  you  almost  with  certainty that no one at 
Camp David in 1971 could have even imagined those events happening 
simultaneously. 
What we  had  not predicted  was  the magnitude and speed of  the 
capital flows that now, various estimates tell me, are forty times the 
trade flow. We were a group of people who were more or less dominated 
by the relationships  between exchange rates and trade, not between 
exchange rates and capital movements. 
Now we are confronted with the situation in which foreign capital 
flows are interacting in a very interesting way with our own economy 
and are financing about 60-65  percent of our deficit. If they had not 
been available, the results, I am persuaded, would have been totally 
different. 
We just were not thinking, fifteen or  twenty years ago, about anything 
like this level of fiscal imbalance, or international imbalance. Now, I 
am not going to talk about domestic deficits. I have been railing about 
them for about five years; I am persuaded they  are near the center 
vortex of many of our other problems. Rather than being “Peter One 
Note” again, I thought I might focus more on the foreign aspect of the 
deficits. 
Table 9.16 presents one scenario of foreign debt and interest projec- 
tions.  In  1971, U.S. investment income, interest income, and so on 
would have been much higher than now in real terms. Therefore, while 
we may have gotten upset about a $7 billion trade deficit, we had all 
the means in.the world to finance it. 
Look out to 1990 and notice that with a $600  billion foreign debt, 
our net U.S. investment income is estimated at about $20 billion. And 
we might have interest costs of about $40-50  billion. And that is only 
Table 9.16  Foreign Debt and Interest Projections (billions of dollars) 
1980  1985  1990 
U.S. net foreign debt 
(1)  Net U.S. investment 
(net investment position)  $ + 106.1  $-93.5  $ -  600 
income  +  28.5  + 12.9  +  20 
(2) Interest income or cost  + 1.9  -  2.7  -  48 
Total net “income”  +  30.4  + 10.2  -  28 
Source; Institute for International  Economics. 
Notes: U.S. and OECD growth: 3.0 percent; LDC growth: 3.75 percent; dollar at level 
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1990. We  are left with the unpleasant question now of how we are going 
to finance those debt service costs. 
I have also studied projections that go out further. If we reduce our 
current account deficits to only $75 billion for another five or ten years, 
we hit a trillion dollars of debt before long, and interest payments get 
even  higher. So in  Herbert  Stein’s immortal words,  if  something’s 
unsustainable, it tends to stop. One of the important questions is how 
it is going to stop, not whether it is going to stop. 
Look at the trade account, because clearly that is the place we must 
look to finance these debt service costs. I remind you of two or three 
obvious sectoral points.  First on the question of oil. Remember that 
about  38  percent  of  our domestic consumption comes from foreign 
sources; the estimates for the next decade range from 50 percent to 70 
percent of our domestic consumption. The odds certainly favor that 
prices will likely go up with demand. So, in the oil sector of our trade 
account, I do not  see how any prudent person can do anything but 
assume that the oil import bill will go up substantially. 
I look with embarrassment at Bruce Atwater and John Block, as I 
try to predict the agricultural aspect of things, but clearly there has 
been  something approaching a  systemic or structural change in  the 
production of grains around the world. Other people have learned how 
to produce them far more efficiently and quickly than we thought they 
could. A number of  us just came back from the Soviet Union, where 
we visited at length with General Secretary Gorbachev, among other 
people, and even he had the courage, or chutzpah, to announce that 
it was his objective to become a net exporter of food. So et tu, Brute, 
I said, as I listened to that. 
So that leads, with all due respect to what Lionel Olmer and Hank 
Greenberg were saying this morning about services, to the manufac- 
turing sector (and I do not know how much nourishment we might get 
there) as being the principal place we might look. To give you an idea 
of what the historians will call a wrenching distortion to our industrial 
structure:  It was five years or so ago that we had  a surplus in our 
manufactured trade accounts of probably $20 billion, and this past year 
we probably have a deficit of around $140 billion in our manufactured 
accounts. 
We  have had a swing that amounts to 15-20  percent of our entire 
capacity, probably 4  percent of the GNP. Now we are about to say that 
we must move into a trade  surplus in the face of  the oil situation I 
mentioned. If  you look at it numerically, you could get to a number 
that might achieve some balance, probably a swing in the manufactured 
accounts of something like $200 billion. 
That $200 billion swing is what occasioned my comment on the first 
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other important nations in the world economy saying that they must 
increase exports very rapidly while at the same time we, the world’s 
leading industrial power, are making exactly the same observation. The 
case therefore for Germany and Japan and others stimulating domestic 
demand, while it is presented often as helping us in the world economy, 
can be easily rationalized in terms of  “they better do it for the sake of 
their own economies, given the inevitable drop in our trade deficit.” 
I have heard at least as many scenarios as there are people in this 
room, and I am not going to get into the projection business. For the 
benefit of some of you who do not follow this too carefully, there are 
roughly three categories of  scenarios: One is the so-called crash land- 
ing, in which there is a sudden loss of foreign confidence and a sudden 
drop in the dollar. There is then a combination of rapid inflation as the 
dollar plunges and recession or worse as interest rates soar. This in 
turn detonates the third world bomb, because you have got the com- 
bination of  slow growth and very high interest rates. And if that is not 
enough to cheer you, a protectionist America responds to that series 
of phenomena. That is the crash scenario. 
Another scenario that is worth looking at is the so-called stop-and- 
go British scenario in which one looks at the British economy not so 
much from the vantage point of the slow gradual decline in productivity 
that began in the late  1800s, but in the more recent response of  the 
economy that was constrained by balance of payments problems. Brit- 
ain in the post-World  War  I1 period was endlessly subjected to the 
whims of foreign confidence and foreign inflows. Their industrial struc- 
ture was  subjected to the yo-yo effects of  the pound  and surges of 
imports. Michael Stuart, a British economist, recently said, “anyone 
who has lived through our forty years of balance of payments crises 
and seen the constraints they have imposed on domestic policies must 
stand amazed at the insouciance with which the United States is piling 
up foreign debt.” 
Finally, there’s the muddling-through, gradual-decline scenario which 
leaves us poorer than we could have been. 
All of them are rude scenarios that are not very happy. All of them 
confront the fact that we must repay our debts in one way or another, 
that we have been consuming far more than we have been producing, 
and that we are going to have to start producing far more than we 
consume. That is a rude fact that the American people are really not 
prepared to confront at the present time. 
I now want to say a word or two about foreign policy implications, 
which we have only alluded to until now. We are facing a country that 
for the  first time is going to  be  seriously  constrained  by  a lack  of 
resources. I will give you three or four quick things to reflect on if you 
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I  guess Corazon Aquino is  as close to the counterpart of  Ronald 
Reagan at the height of his popularity as anybody. The Philippines is 
about as bipartisan a foreign country as we have in terms of support 
and its relationship to our national security. Aquino gives what some 
senators and congressmen have told me is the best  speech that  has 
been given in quite a few years in terms of its response. Yet the way 
we had to grovel around to find $50  million for such a high priority 
foreign policy objective as that is significant. 
As to our friend Mexico, one could make an elegant case that our 
true national security interests could be very much enhanced by some 
kind of  substantial program with Mexico that would include bilateral 
aspects in many areas-investment,  trade, and so forth. But I am not 
sure there are many politicians around in the context of Gramm-Rudman 
who are going to be engaging in innovative new ventures, however 
important, in foreign policy. 
Look at the third world debt problem. I am deeply impressed with 
James Baker in every way and with his program. But the issue of how 
we are going to fund any level of program has not yet really touched 
our consciousness. I chaired a commission for Gerald Ford on federal 
pay. I recall with great interest seeing a survey of American opinion 
on “where do you want to spend more money and where do you want 
to spend less money.”  The only one that ranked below paying public 
officials more was foreign aid. And that was in a different context than 
the current one. 
Let’s take foreign military forces in Europe. After the (adventure or 
misadventure, as you see it) in Rejkjavik, when it was pointed out to 
some of our officials that, in  the zero nuclear world they were hy- 
pothesizing, we would have substantial vulnerability to the Soviet con- 
ventional forces that were far superior to ours, I was amazed to see 
one of  our senior government officials allege that we  can afford to 
spend in a $4 trillion economy whatever we need to spend on defense. 
I am sure in a rational sense that is true. But as a practical political 
matter, I wonder what would happen if after that negotiation someone 
suggested that the United States should spend another $25 billion, or 
$30 billion,  or $40 billion  in  Europe because  it  enhances Europe’s 
security. I think that is a nonevent, as we say. 
So the overwhelming question in the next decade is where do we 
find  the resources, not  simply the  resources  to pay  back  this debt 
service, but the resources to invest in our economic future, because 
any view of the future that I have been able to think about involves a 
desperate need to invest much more in  human resources  and infra- 
structure. We  must rely heavily on our own domestic savings, in view 
of what I said earlier about the inevitable fall of the trade deficit, and 
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have been so concerned about the budget deficit is that it is clearly the 
biggest source of negative savings around, and it is the surest place to 
get increased savings. Because as I look at all of  the studies on the 
effect of  taxes on increased savings, I find the results fairly uncertain 
and hard to predict. So deficit reduction is a big source of savings and 
a sure source. 
Where then do you look for these resources? It seems to me you 
look  abroad and then  you look at home. Let’s start abroad. That is 
going to require a level of  macroeconomic  coordination and burden 
sharing that is utterly unprecedented and probably very difficult. 
Let’s start with NATO. It is impossible for me to visualize the next 
ten years, with the kinds of  constraints we are talking about, where 
the subject of what we are going to do to reduce the NATO  burden 
does not become a very high priority item. How we maintain the al- 
liance while doing that is an important issue. 
I recently came back from the Soviet Union. We  talked to their top 
military officials, their top arms control officials, and so forth. In ad- 
dition to having some fascinating discussions about SDI and how it 
looks to them and so forth, there were intensive discussions about their 
possible interest in reducing 25 percent of their conventional troops 
from the Urals to the Atlantic, and when General Jones and Harold 
Brown pressed them on whether they would destroy equipment, whether 
they would demobilize, whether they would be willing to verify, the 
answers to those questions were yes. Now whether they actually would 
or not is another question. But the point I am trying to make is that I 
find when talking to foreign policy people about the role of resource 
constraints on foreign policy that we are treated  in a very unhappy 
way, as though Why would you ever want to play around with troops 
in  Europe? Why would you ever want to upset a balance of that sort 
that has worked pretty well? Why would you ever want to seriously 
discuss  negotiations  with the Soviet Union  in which  you  might be 
talking about one of your objectives being to reduce the resources that 
are allocated to that purpose? 
And my response to that is threefold: In the first place, we need 
resources. The resources we have allocated there are not going to be 
available to be invested  in other areas that are going to be of great 
importance to the future of this country. Second, we can either reduce 
these resources  on a planned  reciprocal basis,  keeping in mind our 
national security interests, or it can be done because of some external 
event like a financial crisis, in  which our security interests  are not 
protected and in which the reductions are not on a reciprocal basis. 
I just wanted to make the point that I think the foreign policy aspects 
of this deserve a lot of thought, and I am not sure they are getting that 
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On the economic peace-keeping side, James Schlesinger has pointed 
out that post-World  War 11, we were the biggest supplier of capital, the 
guys who financed the multilateral institutions. I think this was one of our 
proudest moments because it helped with the peace as well as the war. 
Where are we today? Japan talks magnificently about how they have 
made commitments of another $2 billion or $3 billion, spread over some 
period of  time, and we  should accept that with gratitude. But in an 
area of limited resources, if we aggregate what we might call the military 
and economic peace-keeping burden together, and they are both bur- 
dens, we would hit about 7 percent or thereabouts, if  we added aid 
plus the military. If  we take Japan’s military plus aid, it is about 1.5 
percent of  GNP. That  spread of  5.5 percent  of GNP happens to be 
about  50 percent  more  than our total investment, net, in  business- 
productivity-enhancing equipment, just to take one number. 
We  ought  to be  talking about some  kind of  division of  labor,  or 
division of burden, on a much larger scale than we have been. 
Now as far as the United States is concerned, we have heard a lot 
at this conference about the third world debt, how it is going to require 
resources. I am not sure the United States will participate in a big way 
in that; I am not even sure it should, given its burdens; Japan (it seems 
to me to some extent) and Europe must step in to this. Saburo Okita 
has always been ahead of me, and he certainly was today; I was going 
to timidly suggest that instead of talking about 1 percent or 2 percent, 
we ought to sit down with Japan and talk to them in larger terms, like 
perhaps adding another 1 percent or 2 percent of the GNP at least over 
this period of time. But as I calculate the number, Okita suggests one- 
third of  the $75  billion being contributed to multilateral institutions. 
That is an order of magnitude beyond anything that is being discussed, 
and it is the appropriate order of magnitude. 
That is going to raise some interesting questions in Washington be- 
cause we are highly ambivalent. We  want all the perquisites and all the 
appearances of being a post-World  War I1 superpower. But alas we are 
not quite willing, nor do we have the resources, to step up to it. 
The other place we can get resources is obviously at home; we should 
look at consumption generally, and subsidized consumption in partic- 
ular. Let us look at four charts that focus on the entitlement programs, 
the transfer payment programs that go to the unpoor, that account for 
about 40 percent of the budget. They have been going up 10- 15 percent 
a year. Figure 9.7 shows that during the seventies the real dollars going 
to defense went down. That made it possible for domestic spending to 
go up painlessly without having to increase taxes. Now we are con- 
fronted with making up for that, and the crunch is on. 
We  continue to insist that Social Security is not part of our problem, 
but figure 9.8 gives an idea of the dominance of Social Security as a Total Government 
Spending (Federal, 
State, and Local) 
per US.  Capita 
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Fig. 9.7  Real public spending per capita: Are we mobilizing for "do- 
mestic" warfare? 
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Fig. 9.8  Forty  years of  Social Security: How much more growth is 
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source of our spending in this country. Now look at figure 9.9, because 
as they say these days, “you ain’t seen nothing yet.” 
I do not know how many of  you are aware, many of the economists 
are, that the Social Security department has three estimates they use 
to project future costs of Social Security. One is called optimistic, case 
one, which I would call hysterical. The second is called-they  are now 
using something called 11-B-intermediate  pessimistic, and who could 
object to that! And then finally, there is something called pessimistic. 
In here I have put all of the estimates that are being used.  For those 
of  you who wish to look at them, they are enormously important for 
predicting the future. 
In the so-called intermediate case, the number of babies being born 
per woman is projected to go up about 10 percent to 12 percent. This 
is in the face of  the fact that there are eleven industrial countries that 
have a lower birth rate than we do, and a number that are even below 
1.6, which is the pessimistic case. I have shown these estimates to a 
group of people without telling them what they are, and typically most 
people look at the pessimistic case and say that sounds about right for 
planning purposes. 
Figure  9.10 shows what the pessimistic  case forecasts, given the 
demographic explosion, and in particular the explosion of  the over- 
eighty-five-year-olds. It shows the modest result that our children would 
have to pay 42 percent of  their pay just to finance the Social Security 
system. This is a projection  that could never happen in terms of  the 
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Fig. 9.10  Social Security:  both the  ‘‘likely’’ and “pessimistic”  sce- 
narios are terrifying. 
economy and in terms of policy.  But this is where this so-called  un- 
touchable program might be leading us. 
The so-called intermediate case calls for 22 percent of payroll. James 
Capra has done some projections using the pessimistic case and leaving 
defense spending where it is. It is clear this case cannot work because 
by the year 2025, interest costs get hysterical when you let deficits of 
5 percent of the GNP pile up (see table 9.17). 
With existing rules, it would  take an additional 7.5 percent of the 
gross national product just to cover non-means-tested entitlement pro- 
grams. This is without thinking about the unfunded liabilities. I submit 
to you that anything remotely like that is simply not affordable, given 
a country that has to focus on the investment side. 
I will end with one further note. I wonder if sometime the NBER 
might organize a conference around the politics of economics. I have 
a feeling that the real problem in our country is that we do not have a 
long-term deep, stable economic consensus of  what the elements are 
of an economic policy. For example, in Germany and Japan there is a 
wide-spread political consensus on the elements of economic policy, 
arising out of the inflation, out of Hitler, and so forth. Japan obviously 
has a deep commitment to savings and investment. 
In our country,  people  say we have a consensus about economic 
policy, but I find it remarkably fickle. We talk about capital formation, 
both sides of  the aisle, without  talking  about consumption. We  had 
supply-side economics in 1980, but by 1986 we ended up with demand- 643  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
Table 9.17  Federal Revenues and Outlays as a Percentage of 
GNP, by  Fiscal Year 
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2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0 
4.9  4.9  4.9  4.7  4.6 
I .3  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.2 
2.3  1.6  1.4  .8  .7 
19.1  19.7  19.4  22.4  2.13 
6.6  6.6  6.6  6.6  6.6 
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4.2  7.6  8.4  20.4  35.5 
24.7  27.7  29.7  42.9  63.5 
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Source: James Capra, Senior Economist, Shearson Lehman Brothers: Consultant, Bi- 
Partisan Budget Appeal. 
Norest 11-B  and III with current nominal interest rates (8 percent): defense constant as 
percentage of GNP: “prudent case” starting point in 1988. 
side economics. We  are now talking about competitiveness; the only 
question is How big is the grab bag and how long is the list? 
The one thing these policies all have in common is that they all avoid 
the underlying fundamental of  what I am talking about, which is es- 
sentially the consumption, savings, investment choice. And we talk 
about how we can solve this problem by ignoring the main element of 
the problem. 
What to do about it, I do not know. There are two approaches that 
have been used in the past politically. I went to a diet doctor a number 
of  years ago. He said, “you’ve been on a lot of diets.”  And  I  said, 
“yeah, I’ve been on a lot of diets,” and I weighed about thirty pounds 
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that people have trouble sustaining denial, sustaining negative visions. 
And what you need is a positive vision that you have become committed 
to.”  So I  said, “well  fine, what does that mean exactly?”  He said, 
“well, until you decide what you want to weigh and what you want to 
look like, we aren’t going to be successful.”  So he walks me over to 
a mirror that was like one of those mirrors you see in county fairs, and 
he has a dial in it. He says, “you weigh 211 pounds now and you said 
you want to weigh  175.” So he dials in  175 pounds, and there is this 
magnificent lean vision. He says, “I want you to look at that for about 
5 or 10 minutes, and then I want that image in your head. Every time 
you sit down and eat I want that positive vision. And then you’ll say 
that’s what I’ve decided to look like.” 
So that is one way we can do it, I guess. If we could sell the American 
people some positive vision. 
The other is the fear of a crisis, which seems to have energized Japan 
and Germany. I do not know which of those it is going to take, but I 
suspect that we can spend days looking at numbers and agreeing on 
the seriousness of  the problem, but until we put equivalent time into 
changing the politics of this country, we are going to be sitting here 
having conferences for years. 
4. James R. Schlesinger 
Domestic Policies and International 
Capital Flows 
I intend to put forward certain propositions that some of  you may 
regard as heretical. In uttering these mild heresies I shall be following 
in the path of my own great mentor of nearly forty years ago, J. H. 
Williams of Harvard. Williams entitled his AEA presidential address 
“An Economist’s Confessions.” In it Williams indulged in those doubts 
and heresies that were his hallmark. My own remarks will be not so 
much the confessions of an economist as those of a sometime govern- 
ment official. 
At the outset I wish to make three preliminary points. The first point 
is a trite one, what has become a commonplace observation: the in- 
ternational economic system has in recent decades become dominated 
by capital flows. In this there is a deep irony. The theory of international 
trade (and even more clearly the policy  reflexes  about international 
trade), as it has come down to us, is erected on Ricardian foundations. 
But Ricardo scarcely acknowledged the existence of capital flows. Thus, 645  International Capital Flows and Domestic Economic Policies 
we face the paradoxical situation that what became  first the major 
equilibrating mechanism and then the dominant element in international 
trade was itself not incorporated in the original theory in international 
trade. 
Ricardo himself thought of the factors of production (land and labor, 
rather than capital) as relatively fixed among nations. Trade, reflecting 
comparative advantage, was based on these more or less permanent 
endowments.  Thus, comparative advantage itself was ,more or less 
permanent.  By  contrast, when  we introduce capital mobility as the 
major element in determining the evolution of the international econ- 
omy (and even more so when capital flows become the dominant ele- 
ment  in  international transactions),  then the basis for the Ricardian 
formulation disappears.  Comparative advantage is no longer perma- 
nent, but  is strongly influenced by the flow of  capital.  Comparative 
advantage-and  thus both the composition and the level of a nation’s 
trade-may  be highly transitory. 
The new equilibrating mechanism, international capital flows, can 
be and intermittently will be highly disruptive. From time to time we 
see the torrential movement of capital, reminiscent of the “hot money 
flows” of the thirties. In its extreme form we see that torrential move- 
ment of capital known as capital fight. Need one observe how disruptive 
such capital flight will be, how little related to a useful equilibrating 
mechanism? 
All of this implies to me that major elements in the actual functioning 
of the internatinal economy are no longer captured within the theory 
of international trade. That implies we should be engaged in the re- 
consideration and the radical restructuring of the contemporary mean- 
ing of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage is now a reflec- 
tion  of  the  unanticipated  mobility  and  the  movement  of  capital. 
Sometimes such movements are torrential. Such movement of capital, 
as opposed to the relatively fixed endowments that Ricardo discussed, 
brings about the volatile movement of exchange rates. That exchange 
rate volatility in turn will suddenly and substantially alter the position 
of domestic industries. Thus, we are immediately faced with a dilemma, 
for here in the American democracy we expect the farmer, the steel- 
worker, the autoworker, the shoe worker, and the textile worker-in 
short, the voters and those who represent these voters-to  accept the 
higher wisdom that makes them the playthings of these larger economic 
forces-and  most particularly the movement of capital. 
Let me turn to my second point: to make the international economic 
system work well there must be recognized rules of the game, accepted 
by the principal parties. To be sure, some sort of equilibrium will come 
about as a result of unfettered market forces, but few governments will 
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be obliged to cooperate in order to obtain the benefits of international 
trade, while not too adversely affecting the interests of the major par- 
ticipants that must be induced to cooperate. 
The rules of the game, generally recognized and accepted, for gov- 
erning international economic activity will not come about automati- 
cally. In times past we had such recognized rules for the game-the 
gold standard especially before World War I and the Bretton Woods 
system after World War 11. To  some extent the Bretton Woods frame- 
work depended on the United States, as the dominant player, to make 
it work. It has now broken down. For a system of  rules of  the game 
to be effective presupposes not only a framework in which trade and 
capital flows take place, but also the willingness of  national govern- 
ments to take actions to make the system work. 
Such a framework, especially the willingness of  national  states to 
take those  actions necessary to make the system work,  has largely 
disappeared. Today we see instead behavior that is typically self-centered 
and ad hoc, designed in response to short-term pressures and having 
long-term consequences that are pernicious.  There was a far deeper 
wisdom in  what emerged after World  War  11, in which each nation 
accepted the obligation to take self-correcting actions to correct a long- 
term disequilibrium in its balance of payments. In the view of those 
who put together the Bretton Woods system, such action was partic- 
ularly necessary for the great creditor nations. 
Let me point out that in  the world today we have only one “great 
creditor nation.” No longer is it the Land of the Free. Rather it is now 
Japan. Japan has been the chief beneficiary of the relatively free system 
of international trade. Yet Japan has been singularly insensitive to the 
obligations imposed upon her by participation in  that world trading 
system from which she has so notably benefited. Today, in addition to 
that one great creditor nation, there is also a notable has-been creditor 
nation. It is, indeed, the Land of the Free, our United States, which 
has lately been transformed into the world’s great debtor nation. The 
United States too, for reasons quite different from Japan, is failing to 
fulfill its obligations to make the system work. 
The third point I wish to make is the decline in the role of conscious 
policy-making. In its place is a corresponding rise  in  reliance  upon 
impersonal  market  forces.  I point  to this phenomenon  simply as a 
datum. Some will regard this change as unfortunate-or even tragic. 
Many today will welcome such a change-as  reflecting diminished re- 
liance on the presumed clumsiness of  government policy and greater 
reliance on supposedly “superior”  market forces. For my  purpose at 
the moment I present it simply as a fact of life. 
No doubt, this trend reflects in considerable degree the disappearance 
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emerged at the close of  World War  11. There has been a loss of real 
power and of influence on the part of the United States that has become 
increasingly (and painfully) obvious during the last two decades. The 
United States faces far greater competition, not only in product markets 
but in critical technologies as well. The United States thus has lost the 
luxury of  a position of  deciding upon the best course of international 
action relatively free of  external pressures upon its own interests. In 
brief, the possibility has now disappeared that the United States, based 
upon its own judgments, can be the preponderant influence in achieving 
needed adjustments in international trade and capital flow. 
But there is more to it than that. In addition to the decline in real 
power, there has been a significant decline in US.  eagerness to make 
the system work. In one of his ironical asides, Sir Dennis Robertson 
referred  to  the  United  States after World  War  I  as  “the  Great  Sir 
Galahad of the West, . . . whose bills were no smaller because his heart 
was pure.” That was a transitory judgment! No such statement would 
have been made after World 11. No other nation could have achieved 
the same missionary zeal, the same Puritan  impulse to labor in  the 
Lord’s vineyard, above all to make the system work, that the United 
States displayed in the two decades after Bretton Woods. 
Such altruistic behavior or missionary zeal has not marked the actions 
of Japan, Germany, or other countries that have emerged in the sub- 
sequent period.  As Charles Kindleberger  has  observed, the  United 
States has now lost much of its appetite for providing what he described 
as “international economic public goods.” These are the actions or the 
institutions that provide spillover benefits for the entire international 
community, benefits exceeding those accruing to the direct provider. 
There has  been  a contraction of focus, most  notably  here  in  the 
United States, from looking at the world as a whole to concentrating 
on the interests of the individual nation. The problem is (and here I 
turn from pointing to a datum of  expressing a policy judgment) that 
the proper functioning of the international economy can only be sat- 
isfactorily attacked on a systematic worldwide basis. The pity (or the 
irony) is that as international economic problems have become more 
urgent and as the need for systemic attack has grown, the motivation 
that might give force to such a systemic attack has  simultaneously 
decreased. 
We  are not going to be able to solve the problems  that afflict the 
international trade and financial system unless and until we recognize 
that it must be a common attack by all the key players, which would 
accept their separate obligations to make the overall system work well. 
Now that I have spelled out my three preliminary points, let me turn 
to a summary of the present scene. What do we see today? As I have 
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rise in the role of economics in the sense of impersonal market forces. 
We  discern both a weakening of the instruments of policy and a weak- 
ened desire to define and achieve policy goals. The world’s largest, 
and in a limited sense, strongest economy has now become a sink for 
foreign capital. Once it was regarded  as the moral obligation of the 
United States to  serve as a provider of capital to poorer  countries. 
Now  the United States has become the sponge that sucks in capital 
from abroad-at  the astonishing rate of over a $100 billion a year. 
We  also observe an international economy marked by massive shifts 
in  capital, whose direction of  flow changes from time to time. Some- 
times for reasons apparently economic or for political reasons, such 
capital movements may become torrential. In general, the capital flows 
from nations with excessive savings (or insufficient consumption) to 
those, like the United States, that are marked by excessive consump- 
tion and insufficient savings. 
These capital movements, subject to reversal, also cause the volatile 
movements of exchange rates. Such volatility undermines what is in- 
dispensible  in the modern capitalist  system: the reliable calculations 
essential for making long-lived investments,  which depend upon  an 
extended planning horizon. 
All  in  all, the international economy is marked  today by ex post 
balancing of  the books-a  simple variant of source-and-use analysis. 
To be sure, there is an examination of how some items move to com- 
pensate for other items. All this takes place in a sort of policy void. 
Not only has there been diminished attention to the policy implications, 
but there has been remarkably little public consideration of what it all 
means-for  the country and the world. 
All of this might be tolerable except for one ineluctable point. It is 
unsustainable.  Something that is unsustainable tends to come to an 
end. What we see today is a system akin to water building up behind 
a barrage. The water continues to collect behind the barrage until the 
barrage ultimately collapses. 
Where do we want the country to go-politically,  strategically, mor- 
ally, ethically? Are we satisfied to be a sink for international capital. 
Is self-concern sufficient? Are we content to be the playthings of “im- 
personal forces”? Are we indifferent to the problems that we create 
for future generations of Americans, indifferent to the call to aid the 
less fortunate, indifferent to the need for international stability? 
Let me turn now to the critical question: how these broader inter- 
national developments affect-and  in  turn are affected by-domestic 
policies. Domestic policies are themselves largely a reflection of  do- 
mestic politics, domestic perceptions and preoccupations, and, if  you 
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I  have  already  more  than  hinted  at my  belief  that  international 
stability  requires  intelligent  international  policy-making.  In a  sense 
this sounds like a call for a Kantian Imperative. But how to achieve 
it  in  a world  of  self-centered,  economic policies  is, of  course,  the 
difficult question. Nonetheless, international stability will require at a 
minimum a harmonization of policies among the principal players in 
the game. 
Such action is, to be sure, in the long-term self-interest of the major 
nations.  Adjustment  of the international  imbalances is coming.  It is 
unavoidable. The adjustment brought about by “impersonal forces” 
will prove highly distressing, if not devastating, to some nations. Nei- 
ther the current American  payments deficit  nor the trade deficit is 
sustainable over the intermediate term. But that implies that nations 
that have become dependent upon export surpluses must seek other 
means of sustaining levels of employment and output, to say nothing 
of further economic growth. It also implies a revival of the American 
manufacturing base. Quite clearly, the decline of the dollar required to 
bring about a “market adjustment” under these conditions will be as 
painful to us as  it will be to  others. The question is not whether existing 
imbalances will be eliminated, but how. 
It seems self-evident that rather than have painful adjustment forced 
upon individual nations by external conditions, they should seek grad- 
ual improvement through deliberate adjustment. I am not particularly 
optimistic. Over the years I have observed that national policies tend 
to reflect deep-seated urges rather than rational calculation. The dismal 
science is perhaps sufficiently dismal that it ought not be additionally 
burdened with Freudian psychology. But to borrow a Freudian meta- 
phor (for those of you who might welcome it), characteristically  na- 
tional policies are driven more by the Id than by the Ego. 
If national policies are not driven by neuroses reflecting overreaction 
to prior national traumas, such policies at least reflect national habits 
that are very deeply ingrained. Consider, for example, the quotation 
cited earlier by David Hale in the Times: “the U.S. is a debtor nation 
with the habits of a creditor nation. Germany and Japan are creditor 
nations with  the habits of  debtor nations.”  Such ingrained  national 
habits prolong the imbalances in the international system. But the new 
volatility  in  the international  economy,  in particular the more rapid 
movements and the interruptions  of capital flows, implies that the slow- 
paced adjustment based on the alterations of ingrained national habits 
is no longer adequate. At the moment each of the key nations not only 
has these deep-seated urges, but appears to have enshrined them. It 
requires conscious policies  successfully  carried out to facilitate  ad- 
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Quite clearly, on the international scene we do not have what econo- 
mists have regularly presupposed: a rational policy-making model. 
Consider the case of the United States. In recent years fiscal policy 
has been dominated, if  not crippled, bu  an antitax mood on the part 
of the public that has precluded revenues even remotely approaching 
the level of public expenditures on which the public insists. American 
fiscal policy has become a scandal-in  relation either to our prior fiscal 
standards or to expectations about the behavior of the world’s leading 
power. The public’s antitax mood, perhaps now fading, was driven by 
a belief that we had been conned by government (“fraud, waste, and 
abuse”), and consequently we came to resent the personal  sacrifices 
that we had borne willingly in the past. 
The erosion of the revenue base is driven by two elements. The first 
is Lafferism. Lafferism propounds the simple rule of thumb or, more 
precisely, the illusion that if  tax rates are cut, somehow, through the 
release of pent-up energies, there will be an immense gusher of reve- 
nues that will more than offset the decline in tax rates and thus bring 
about fiscal balance. Lafferism provided us with a rationale, however 
flimsy, for doing what we apparently wanted to do anyhow. 
The second element was the antitax revolt. In its more civilized form 
it is provided a certain respectability in the editorial pages of the Wall 
Street Journal and other publications. In its more dramatic-and  cer- 
tainly more primitive form-it  is embodied in Proposition  13, passed 
in California in the mid-1970s. It is based upon the belief that if  one 
cuts revenues, that one will be obliged to reduce expenditures. In that 
fashion it has worked in California with its ever-growing population 
and revenue base and somewhat luxuriant levels of expenditures, as 
well as its balanced budget requirement. Its imitations elsewhere have 
been less successful. 
At the federal level the conviction took hold, after the Lafferist hope 
that we could have our fiscal cake and eat it too proved illusionary and 
ephemeral, that the reduction and revenues would  “force”  the Con- 
gress sharply to reduce domestic programs, presumably unwanted and 
wasteful. 
Curiously, this conviction  existed in parallel  with another convic- 
tion-that  the Congress would be prepared to accept an extended mil- 
itary buildup over the years in which military outlays would ultimately 
reach about 9 percent of the Gross National Product. 
As  might  be  expected,  the  device  of  revenue-denial-to-limit- 
expenditures has proved to be a  half  truth. Congress has not  been 
“forced”  sharply to reduce domestic  programs.  It has imposed  re- 
straints, but the radical shrinkage in projected  appropriations has oc- 
curred in President Reagan’s proposed military buildup. Congress im- 
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annual reductions in defense expenditures. Rather than rising toward 
the 9 percent of  the Gross National Product as intended, defense ap- 
propriations are now shrinking back toward the 6 percent level. While 
limiting revenues clearly does reduce expenditures, only one with ideo- 
logical blinders could have expected a different outcome. 
To  sustain the now-ingrained habits and the expectations of  Amer- 
icans would require an immense and continuing inflow of foreign capital 
resulting in a steadily burgeoning level of  American indebtedness to 
foreigners. Americans have come to like high consumption, low or zero 
savings, low tax rates. Americans have also liked the high dollar (a 
demand now rapidly being eroded). That high dollar not only satisfies 
personal  needs  when  one  travels  abroad; it  has  also been  a major 
element in national security and in our international role. One conse- 
quence of the fall of the dollar will be a deterioration in the international 
security position of the United States. We  shall find it both increasingly 
costly and  increasingly difficult  to sustain our commitments.  In  an 
earlier period in which the dollar declined, we saw the pressures for 
the Mansfield amendment and similar difficulties. As the living stan- 
dards and the treatment of our forces overseas deteriorate, domestic 
political pressures build within the United States to reduce the level 
of forces. The high dollar may be our historic preference; it may be in 
our own national security interest and clearly even more in the national 
security interest of our allies. Nonetheless, the high dollar is a thing 
of  the past. It can no longer be sustained-even by immense inflows 
of foreign capital. 
A debtor nation will find it difficult to sustain the international se- 
curity obligations that the United States has borne. This points to a 
larger truth. If Americans are to sustain their present habits-low  do- 
mestic  savings, large capital imports, the center of the free world’s 
security system-ultimately  it  would require that foreigners  be pre- 
pared periodically to wipe out their claims against the United States. 
This is not a likely development. 
Let me cite one other national habit that may no longer be a luxury 
we can afford. In the United States we tend to confuse the free economy 
with laissez-faire. But nothing about the free market implies that any- 
thing goes. That results in  the misdirection, indeed the waste, of  the 
energies of our senior executives. Many of our senior executives, who 
are not  investing their time searching for new takeover targets, are 
spending much of  their  time either fending off  corporate raiders or 
searching for the white knights who contingently will help them fend 
off corporate raiders. From a national standpoint, much of such activity 
represents sheer waste. It contributes little to the more efficient pro- 
duction of  goods  and  services or to the improvement of  American 
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Darrman’s stringent comments regarding the inefficiencies and misdi- 
rected efforts of American executives. 
Let us turn to the deep-seated urges and their effects in places other 
than the United States. Consider what might be the polar contrast to 
the United  States: the case of Japan. Japan is the archetype of the 
creditor nation with the ingrained habits of a debtor. Among the market 
economies, Japan has achieved a persistent and  remarkable perfor- 
mance as a savings-generating machine. But Japan has no effective way 
of absorbing such high savings into domestic investment. Consequently, 
in flagrant violation of the spirit of Bretton Woods, its economic per- 
formance has become vulnerably dependent upon the maintenance of 
a large export surplus. If the Japanese wish to sustain a high-savings, 
low-consumption, high-employment economy driven by an export sur- 
plus, it must accept periodic extinction of the claims against foreigners, 
notably the extinction of claims against the United States. Otherwise, 
the Japanese economic “style”  is unsustainable.  Only the American 
market could absorb over many years the outflow of goods that the 
Japanese produce. Ultimately, even the American capacity for the ab- 
sorption of Japanese exports is becoming satiated. 
While Japan may be the polar case, what is true for Japan is also 
true for others. Ultimately  it is true for the Federal Republic,  even 
though  German membership in  the European economic community 
provides a cushion for sustaining German exports. Ultimately it will 
also be true for Korea, a kind of post-Japan Japan. The Koreans  possess 
a cushion in their margin for raising their very low living standards. 
But in the long run it too must change. The simple truth is that no great 
trading  nation  can over a long  period  of  time be dependent for its 
economic health on the maintenance on a very large trade surplus. 
Just as the American trade deficit cannot be indefinitely sustained, 
so those economies dependent upon export surpluses will ultimately 
find that neither can they be sustained. The question is not whether 
these balance of payments anomalies, which over recent years we have 
observed with increasing clarity and concern, will be eliminated; the 
only questions are when and how. Will the return to a sustainable long- 
term equilibrium be based on gradual adjustment reflecting conscious 
policy-or,  conversely,  will  it reflect  a  sudden so-called market ad- 
justment or an angry political reaction? 
Economists sometimes refer either mysteriously or  hopefully to self- 
correcting forces. The normal  inference  is  that  such self-correcting 
forces imply smooth transitions. Indeed, there are such self-correcting 
forces. But they need not convey a smooth adjustment to a new equi- 
librium. Rather those self-correcting forces will appear, as in Greek 
mythology, as Nemeses. 
The U.S. trade deficit, which has swollen to bizarre levels, inevitably 
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1987). And, in terms of economic time, it will end relatively soon-not 
necessarily in the next few years, but clearly within the next decade. 
When the decline sets in, it will proceed rapidly. The ability of the rest 
of the world to absorb either dollars or dollar claims against the United 
States is not unlimited. 
Thus the activity on Capitol Hill represents a belated reaction. As 
is so frequently the case, it represents an attempt to lock the barn door 
after the horse has been stolen. (It might also be observed that a good 
deal of the handwringing about “protectionism,” given U.S. trade def- 
icits in excess of  $150 billion dollars a year, is also exaggerated.) It is 
not wise to invest too much energy in protesting against inevitability. 
Other nations in the world should prepare for the day that the U.S. 
trade deficit will be eliminated. 
Economists sometimes have a rather naive faith in the role of the 
price mechanism and therefore in the likelihood of smooth adjustments. 
But  if  decisions, as is  so regularly  the case,  are not  based  on the 
presupposed  economic  rationality,  adjustments,  rather  than  being 
smooth, may come in the form of an earthquake. Far more frequently 
than contemplated in economic models, real-world decisions are based 
on ingrained habits, bilateral relations, or sheer national prejudice or 
self-centeredness. Consequently, the likelihood is high that real-world 
adjustment will be traumatic. 
Curiously enough it is not the United  States that will suffer most 
from the elimination of the American trade deficit. To be sure, the rate 
growth of  U.S. living standards will be squeezed, even if  there is not 
an actual reduction for a few years. But that pain should be partially 
relieved by the revivification of the American manufacturing base and 
an employment boom. 
It is the export-oriented, export-dependent nations that ultimately 
will suffer the most from the elimination of  these unsustainable trade 
imbalances. The most obvious sufferer will be Japan, but others will 
suffer as well. As the American trade deficit is sharply reduced, those 
overseas suppliers will experience the painful loss of foreign markets. 
They will also experience the high cost embodied in the wastage of 
invested capital which we  so dramatically saw at the time of  the oil 
shocks. There will be a rise  in  unemployment, concentrated in  the 
export-oriented nations but spreading beyond them. 
The conclusion that one is led to is rather pessimistic--a  dismal note 
going beyond the dismal science. It reflects psychological considera- 
tions-those  deep-seated national impulses to which I referred earlier. 
Economists find it easy to paint a smooth transition from one static 
equilibrium to another. One can, of  course, theorize about Japan ad- 
justing rapidly, or Germany adjusting rapidly, to changes in the external 
market. But both countries are marked by those deeply ingrained na- 
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matter-that  Japan can rapidly make the kind of adjustments outlined 
in the Maekawa report. Consequently, as the American trade deficit 
recedes, the Japanese will be unable  to avoid the lengthy period  of 
economic difficulty. 
Despite some notable differences, the conclusion regarding Germany 
is similar. While Germany’s positions may be eased by its membership 
in the European economic community, its “neurosis”  regarding any- 
thing that smacks of inflation is even more deep-seated. Thus, govern- 
ment policies  designed to stimulate domestic demand, as the export 
surplus shrinks, will face substantial psychological and political obsta- 
cles.  Both the demographic  structure of its population with the high 
proportion of the aging and the prospective shrinkage of the population 
add to the difficulty of justifying expenditures on domestic infrastruc- 
ture in stimulating additional consumption. 
Earlier I emphasized the desirability of conscious policy-making within 
the international community as the preferred  way to achieve adjust- 
ment.  I  strongly  believe  that  such  action, akin to the  enlightened 
institution-building after World War 11, is the proper way to deal with 
the imbalances and distortions in the international economy. But later 
I have conceded that the psychological  obstacles, those deep-seated 
national impulses, will make exceedingly difficult the acceptance by 
individual nations of the required actions. I began by stating my in- 
tention to present certain propositions that some of  you might regard 
as heretical. I believe I have done just that. If in the academic world 
there is the equivalent of a defrocked priest, it may apply to  a sometime 
economist who will have his Ph.D. rescinded. 
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Several people commented on the shape that the world economy will 
take when the imbalance in the US. current account is eliminated. 
James Schlesinger suggested that eventually the United States should 
run  a current account surplus, as befits  the biggest  economy in  the 
world. This implies a substantial  revival of manufacturing, as  the public 
relearns to purchase American goods. One of the implications of this, 
he noted, is that a lot of capital investment is needed in electric power 
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Peter Peterson remarked that he would be interested in investigating 
the compatibility, in the context of a global model, of a balanced U.S. 
current account, given that the United States now imports 60 percent 
of the manufacturing exports of the third world. Martin Feldstein thought 
it could be compatible, and Anne Krueger agreed, suggesting that an 
American current account balance would be compatible with third world 
needs due to the corresponding shift in the capital flows toward LDCs, 
allowing their imports to rise. 
Lionel Olmer was impressed with the prediction  of  an elimination 
of the trade deficit in the near future. There is no sign of this reduction 
now nor of any resurgence in manufacturing.  Schlesinger responded 
that the prediction  of  a recovery in manufacturing follows from the 
projected elimination of the trade deficit. This will presumably happen, 
he reasoned, with some increase in  quality but primarily through an 
increase in price competitiveness. When foreigners no longer want to 
to accept U.S. obligations, the transformation of  the balance of  pay- 
ments will occur. When this happens depends on political psychology, 
but Schlesinger predicted it within five or seven years. Several people 
pointed out that the satiation of foreign borrowers is happening faster 
than it might seem since recently foreign governments have been filling 
in for falling private demand for U.S. obligations. 
Martin Feldstein remarked that a large fraction of the adjustment in 
the real exchange from its peak may  already have taken place, and 
agreed with Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Frankel, who both claimed 
that the trade deficit would decrease to about $100 billion per year as 
a result of the recent fall of the dollar to its current level. 
Several participants raised some doubts about the prospects for a 
smooth adjustment process. Anne Krueger suggested that without a 
decrease in excess demand in the United  States, there will be little 
change in the situation and then a sudden crash. Charles Parry sum- 
marized the problem by observing that our consumption is greater than 
our income and worried that, since Americans seem to respond pri- 
marily to crises, it would be difficult to solve the aggregate problems 
without some real economic conflagration. 
Schlesinger feared the effects of a large fall in the dollar, noting the 
impact of a low dollar-mark exchange rate on the real wages of Amer- 
ican soldiers and their families in Germany and hence on the willingness 
of  Americans to support the U.S.  troop commitment to NATO.  He 
echoed the fears of an economic crisis, suggesting that sustained infla- 
tion is a real possibility given the low tolerance in the United States 
for high unemployment and the likelihood that the fall in the dollar and 
the weakening of foreign competition will also lead to the restoration 
of union bargaining power. 
Feldstein asked why the Japanese in particular focus on protecting 
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instead of  letting the market allocate the pain.  Saburo Okita replied 
that there is a trade-off between voluntary export restraint and letting 
the yen appreciate. In this context, Okita recalled an occasion about 
seven or eight years ago in London when several British economists 
said that the British government needed to establish import penetration 
ratios in twenty major industries and noted a similar trend currently in 
the United States. Quantitative limits may be better than allowing full 
exchange rate adjustment because with only price adjustment the dollar 
may fall too low, leading to low growth in Japan and Germany, de- 
creased demand for American exports, and a vicious circle. 
Schlesinger’s fears about a pure exchange rate adjustment, which he 
noted  would happen if  nothing else does, were about its effects on 
foreign policy. A radical political change in the world could result from 
a drastic fall in the dollar. American strategic objectives would change, 
and the ethical obligation to provide for the poor would not be likely 
to revive. Grand policy aspirations, he suggested, are the luxury of  a 
creditor nation. 
In conclusion Schlesinger outlined three political-economic scenar- 
ios, in order of decreasing likelihood. First, a steep fall in the value of 
the dollar could lead to an increase in inflation and interest rates, while 
a failure to deal with the budget deficit could cause aggregate demand 
to remain high, leading to high interest rates and stagflation. 
In a second and perhaps overly optimistic scenario, in Febraury 1989 
a new president  oversees an attack on the new problems facing the 
country and a sixty-day campaign is waged on incorrect domestic pol- 
icies, based on some of the principles we have discussed today. The 
third possibility is an external shock, probably caused by  an adven- 
turesome third world country. 
Robert Bartley explained that he had a different model from most 
of the people at the conference. He never believed in the Club of Rome 
predictions, never thought that James Schlesinger’s 50 cent/gallon gas- 
oline tax was the answer to the energy crisis, and disagrees with much 
that has been said at this conference. 
He argued that the balance of trade numbers themselves should be 
of little concern. Next to M1, the balance of trade is the most misleading 
economic statistic reported. We  had a trade deficit for our first one 
hundred years as a nation, and the only time we have had a surplus 
was during the Great Depression. The trade deficit is not a problem: 
to straighten it out we need only a recession, and protectionism would 
lead to this recession. 
Bartley recalled that Alan Reynolds in the Wall Street Journal re- 
cently collected quotations from many years ago asking how long Japan 
could continue to buy from the rest of  the world twice what it sells. 
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The trade debate is a mercantilist debate, and the best solution to 
the problem would be to stop collecting figures, but since this is not 
good for the economics profession it would be better to publish five 
trade balances as was done until 1976. The problem with analysis based 
on this number is Where is the bottom line? The deficit is not a sign 
of weakness. Americans buy Japanese cars; Japanese buy U.S. asets; 
we are all consenting adults, so who cares? We  are recycling excess 
Japanese savings into the world economy, which is a good thing for all 
concerned. 
We  have overcome a great inflation without a great depression, so 
far, and this is remarkable. There has been rapid job creation and a 
five-year expansion, and the U.S. trade deficit has kept it going. We 
need some aggregate demand in the world. 
In the process, foreigners have acquired debt, but what is the sig- 
nificance of who holds the debt? Does it really matter if  it is in a safe 
in Zurich or a safe in New York, and which citizen holds it? 
The dollar will not go to 120 yen. If  it did, it would be inflationary 
in the United States and contractionary in Japan, and the Fed would 
tighten as the Japanese loosened, and the dollar would arrest its fall. 
This would lead to what we need, faster Japanese growth and slower 
U.S.  growth, and the trade balance will straighten out. The problem 
has been that for a long time Japanese and German monetary policy 
has been too tight. As they recognize this too, the deficit will correct 
itself, Bartley concluded. 
Schlesinger suggested that Bartley’s strategic model is entirely differ- 
ent from his economic model, and he acknowledged that though Bar- 
tley’s remarks were generally true, the implication is that the United States 
will decline relative to Japan and Germany, and the strategic and political 
implications of this would be serious. Bartley rejected a dichotomy be- 
tween his models, proposing that he and Schlesinger agreed that a strong 
economy was important and disagreed only about what makes a strong 
economy. He added that usually a strategic power with a strong economy 
also has a fixed exchange rate and a convertible currency. 
Rudiger Dornbusch suggested that the U.S. budget deficit might be- 
long in Bartley’s model. He also subscribed to the idea that there is a 
difference between a trade deficit in capital goods and a trade deficit 
in consumer goods, so the comparison with Korea and Japan might be 
specious.  He asked Bartley  about the difference  between  the U.S. 
situation now and that of Chile and Argentina in the 1970s. He proposed 
that a distinction would have to be based on the ability of the United 
States to raise a lot of tax revenue at the end of the consumption spree. 
Bartley answered that the difference is that their foreign debt is de- 
nominated in dollars while our debt is in dollars, so we have greater 
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Martin Feldstein argued that the income elasticities of import demand 
demonstrate that the trade balance effects of faster growth abroad and 
slower growth here will not redress the trade balance.  For example, 
an increase of two percentage points in non-U.S. growth in the entire 
world would lead to only a $15 billion or $20 billion decrease in  the 
U.S. trade deficit over two or three years. Something else has to give, 
he concluded. Bartley said that he had seen other figures and in any 
case it will be an interesting test. 
Thomas Enders emphasized the impact of running trade deficits on 
the ability of the country to lead and to sustain a consensus for defense. 
As foreign central banks  substitute  for private  foreign investors  in 
holding U.S. assets, the United States loses the ability to decide on its 
own reserves and exchange rate. Bartley interpreted the large amount 
of official financing of the U.S. deficit by foreign central banks in 1986 
to mean that these banks are already feeling the pinch of  the lower 
dollar. Up to now they have been intervening in a sterilized fashion, 
without affecting their domestic money supply. This is stupid and in- 
effectual and soon they will have to change their money supply, which 
will stabilize exchange rates. 